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IMPROVING RETIREMENT SAVINGS OPTIONS FOR 
EMPLOYEES 
James Kwak

 
 
Americans do not save enough for retirement.  One reason is that our 
retirement savings accounts—whether employer-sponsored defined-
contribution plans such as 401(k) plans or individual retirement accounts—
are heavily invested in actively managed mutual funds that siphon off tens 
of billions of dollars in fees every year, yet deliver returns that trail the 
overall market.  Under existing law, as interpreted by the courts, mutual 
funds may charge high fees to investors, and companies may offer 
expensive, active funds to their employees.  This Article argues that the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act should be reinterpreted, in light 
of basic principles of trust investment law and the underlying purpose of 
the statute, to strongly encourage employers to offer low-cost index funds 
in their pension plans.  Existing Department of Labor regulations should be 
modified to clarify that the current safe harbor for participant-directed 
plans (in which participants select among investment options chosen by 
plan administrators) does not extend to plans that include expensive, 
actively managed funds.  This would improve the investment options 
available to American workers and increase their chances of generating 
sufficient income in retirement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
America faces a looming retirement security crisis.  Social Security 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, which has traditionally provided a basic 
stream of income to retired workers, is threatened both by the projected 
exhaustion of the Social Security trust funds (currently forecast for 2036),
1
 
and by the resulting calls from both Republicans and Democrats to reduce 
program benefits.
2
  Traditional defined benefit pensions, in which 
 
 1.  THE BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST 
FUNDS ANN. REP. 3 (2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2011/tr2011.pdf.  
Technically speaking, there are two separate Social Security trust funds, but it is 
conventional to analyze them in the aggregate.  Once the trust funds are exhausted, benefit 
payments will be limited to incoming payroll taxes, which will be insufficient to pay full 
scheduled benefits. 
 2.  The bipartisan deficit commission formed by President Barack Obama in 2010, for 
example, recommended reducing the Social Security benefit formula for all but the lowest-
income participants, increasing the full retirement age, and reducing cost-of-living 
adjustments.  NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF 
TRUTH 49–52 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission. 
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employers promise their employees a guaranteed annual income in 
retirement, have largely made way for defined contribution pensions such 
as 401(k) plans, in which employees are responsible for setting aside 
money and investing it for retirement, generally choosing from a list of 
investment options selected by the employer.
3
  In 2009, however, of all 
households with a head of household between the ages of 57 and 66, only 
63% had any retirement accounts–and the median value of those accounts 
was less than $86,000.
4
  Rising health care costs disproportionately affect 
the elderly because of their high consumption of health care and the 
significant cost sharing imposed by Medicare, and Medicare’s increasingly 
precarious financial straits make it highly likely that tomorrow’s retirees 
will face some combination of higher premiums and lower benefits.
5
 
Accumulating enough money for retirement boils down to three 
things:  putting aside money from your current income, generating 
investment returns from that money, and not dipping into your retirement 
savings prematurely.  This Article focuses on the second element of this 
formula.  A fundamental problem for many Americans is that they simply 
do not have good investment alternatives available in the employer-
sponsored defined contribution plans that are their primary retirement 
savings vehicle.  Decades of research have shown that, when investing in 
relatively liquid and efficient markets such as the U.S. stock market, most 
people are better off putting their money in low-cost index mutual funds, 
which attempt to track the overall market or a major market segment, rather 
 
gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf (proposing Social Security reform); 
see also BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. DEBT REDUCTION TASK FORCE, RESTORING AMERICA’S 
FUTURE: REVIVING THE ECONOMY, CUTTING SPENDING AND DEBT, AND CREATING A SIMPLE, 
PRO-GROWTH TAX SYSTEM 75–78 (2010), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/rep 
ort/restoring-americas-future (recommending lower benefits for higher-income 
beneficiaries, indexing the benefit formula to longevity, and changing the index used for 
cost-of-living adjustments). 
 3.  The specific investment options may be selected by a separate plan administrator, 
but that administrator is itself selected by the employer. 
 4.  Jesse Bricker et al., Surveying the Aftermath of the Storm: Changes in Family 
Finances from 2007 to 2009 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary 
Affairs, Working Paper No. 17, 2011) app. tbl.2A-B, available at http://www.federalreserv 
e.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2009p.htm. 
 5.  President Obama’s 2010 deficit commission, for example, recommended limiting 
growth in federal government health care spending to the rate of GDP growth plus one 
percentage point, which is well below historical and current increases in health care 
spending due to demographic changes and rising health care costs.  NAT’L COMM’N ON 
FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, supra note 2, at 41–42; see also BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 
DEBT REDUCTION TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 51, 55–56 (recommending an increase in 
Medicare Part B premiums and shifting Medicare to a premium support model where 
growth in government spending is capped at the rate of GDP growth plus one percentage 
point). 
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than in more expensive, actively managed mutual funds, which attempt to 
beat the market by betting on particular stocks or groups of stocks.  Yet 
many companies offer active funds in their 401(k) plans, and as of 2009, 
the average stock fund in a 401(k) plan had an expense ratio of 74 basis 
points, meaning that investors paid 0.74% of their assets every year for the 
privilege of investing in that fund,
6
 while major domestic stock index funds 
are available for as little as six basis points.
7
  In addition, active funds tend 
to underperform the market, so their investors’ retirement savings are 
eroded by lower gross returns (before expenses) as well as by higher fees. 
The problems of high mutual fund fees and poor fund selection are not 
new, but the traditional “solutions” have so far proven ineffective.  Mutual 
funds are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act),
8
 
which Congress amended in 1970 to impose on fund advisers (the 
companies that collect fees for managing mutual funds’ money) “a 
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services.”
9
  
The courts have historically held that this requirement is met by any fee 
that is roughly consistent with industry practice, a position that was 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2010 in Jones v. Harris Associates 
L.P., and that essentially blesses the status quo.
10
  Employer-sponsored 
pension plans are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), which imposes various fiduciary duties on the trustees and 
administrators of those plans.
11
  In exchange, employer-sponsored plans 
enjoy important tax preferences that help companies attract and retain 
workers.  Although plan participants and beneficiaries can sue their 
employers for breach of those duties,
12
 the courts have so far declined to 
hold that plan fiduciaries, including the plan’s administrators, trustee, and 
 
 6.  INV. CO. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND 
ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 110 (51st ed. 2011), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2011_factbook.pdf.  This is an asset-weighted average, meaning that 
the expense ratio for each fund is weighted by the number of dollars invested in that fund. 
 7.  As of late 2012, the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund had an expense ratio 
of six basis points for investments of at least $10,000.  Vanguard Total Stock Market Index 
Fund Admiral Shares, VANGUARD GROUP, INC., https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/sna 
pshot?FundId=0585&FundIntExt=INT (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). 
 8.  Investment Company Act of 1940, 14 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
 9.  14 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970). 
 10.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010). 
 11.  Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001–1461 & scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114 (2006) (containing 
fiduciary duty provisions of ERISA §§ 401–414). 
 12.  “Participants” are employees or former employees who are eligible for or may 
become eligible for benefits because of their employment and “beneficiaries” are other 
people who are or may become eligible for benefits, typically because they have been 
designated by participants. 
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investment managers,
13
 have a duty to protect participants from the higher 
costs and typically lower returns of active funds.  The courts generally rely 
on ERISA section 404(c), which protects fiduciaries from liability for 
losses incurred as a result of participants’ own investment decisions.
14
 
In this Article, I make a new legal argument for strongly encouraging 
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans to offer only index funds 
(for market segments where low-cost indexing is available).  ERISA, by 
construction and according to the interpretation of the Supreme Court, 
explicitly incorporates the principles of trust law.  The core principles of 
trust investment law, as codified in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts—
including the duty of diversification, the duty to avoid unreasonable costs, 
and the duty to avoid imprudent delegation—establish a presumption in 
favor of passive (index) investing and against active investing, at least in 
market segments that are relatively liquid and efficient.  The key question 
is what this presumption implies for a situation where plan participants are 
allowed to exercise control over their accounts—control explicitly 
endorsed by ERISA.  I argue that plan fiduciaries’ duty to protect 
participants from poor investment choices does not simply evaporate in this 
context.  Instead, while fiduciaries should offer a set of investment options 
that enable participants to tailor their portfolios to their individual risk-
return preferences, the core duties of diversifying investments, avoiding 
unreasonable costs, and avoiding imprudent delegation, still apply where 
participants select from an array of investment options, and the duties still 
establish a presumption against active funds. 
This argument is based on existing law, and a court that agrees with 
the argument could already hold that the inclusion of expensive, actively 
managed funds in an employer pension plan constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty.  In defending against such claims, employers typically point 
to regulations written by the Department of Labor  (as authorized by 
ERISA section 404(c)) that determine when plan fiduciaries are shielded 
from liability for losses caused by the participant’s exercise of control.  
Those regulations can be satisfied by a plan that includes expensive active 
 
 13.  In general,  
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition 
of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, 
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or 
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.   
§ 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012). 
 14.  § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006). 
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funds, but they admit two possible interpretations.  The Department of 
Labor claims that this safe harbor only covers liability for bad investment 
decisions made by participants, not liability for poor selection of 
investment options in the first place.  The courts have split on this question, 
with some holding that compliance with the regulations protects plan 
fiduciaries from both forms of liability. 
To clarify this situation, the regulations should be modified in light of 
the interpretation of ERISA summarized above.  The safe harbor provided 
by section 404(c) should be restricted to retirement plans that include only 
index funds.  Plans including active funds would not necessarily violate 
ERISA-imposed fiduciary duties but would not benefit from the automatic 
safe harbor and would be susceptible to judicial review on a case-by-case 
basis.  This would be more consistent with the principles of trust law as 
applied to ERISA and, most importantly, would improve the set of 
investment options available to workers in their retirement plans.  A more 
modest alternative that could still have significant practical benefits would 
be granting the section 404(c) safe harbor to plans that make index funds 
the default investment allocation for plan participants but allow participants 
to opt into active funds.  While this is far from a complete solution to our 
country’s retirement security challenges, it would at least remove one 
significant drain on families’ retirement accounts. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the policy problem:  
the importance of mutual funds to the overall retirement landscape, the 
superiority of index funds to active funds for ordinary investors, and the 
prevalence of active funds in the overall market and in retirement accounts.  
Part II surveys the historical attempts to prevent mutual funds from 
charging high fees and to encourage employers to offer good funds to their 
employees.  Part III lays out the central argument of this Article—that the 
core principles of trust investment law, as applied to ERISA, establish a 
strong presumption against including active funds in employer-sponsored 
plans—and describes how this presumption could be implemented.  Part IV 
addresses the relationship of public policy to legal doctrine and discusses 
whether the proposals in this Article are either too radical (not sufficiently 
supported by legal doctrine) or too modest (insufficient to solve the overall 
policy problem).  Part V concludes by situating the Article’s proposals 
within the history of America’s public-private retirement system. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
A. The Retirement Security Challenge 
Many Americans face the ominous prospect of not having enough 
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money to live on in their old age.
15
  Historically, retirees have depended on 
three main sources of income:  Social Security, private pensions, and 
individual savings.  Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system in which a 
payroll tax, levied on most wage earners and their employers, funds 
annuitized benefits paid to current and future retirees.  Private pensions are 
tax-advantaged retirement plans created by private or public organizations 
in which employees or their employers set aside money that will ostensibly 
be used to provide income to those employees in retirement.
16
  In this 
Article, “pensions” refers to both defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans.  Individual savings are additional funds that people set aside for 
retirement, often through various types of Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs), which also enjoy tax preferences. 
Social Security currently promises modest benefits even to people 
who are now relatively young,
17
 but whether the Social Security 
Administration will be able to pay those benefits is another question.  In 
2009, for the first time, the payroll taxes that finance Social Security were 
insufficient to pay current benefits, forcing the programs to draw on their 
accumulated trust funds.
18
  As the baby boom generation retires, the 
imbalance between tax revenues and benefit payments will only get worse, 
leading to the exhaustion of the trust funds around 2036.
19
  After that point, 
Social Security will only be able to pay about 77% of the benefits 
scheduled under current law.
20
  This funding gap has created political 
pressure for a solution that will likely include a reduction in benefits to 
retirees.
21
  In addition, Medicare—the federal program on which most 
retirees depend for health insurance—is in shakier financial condition, with 
spending projected to grow from 3.7% of GDP in 2011 to 6.7% of GDP in 
 
 15.  See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the 
Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
938, 940–62 (2007) (anticipating, in 2007, a “perfect storm” caused by longer life 
expectancies and current workers not saving enough for retirement, threatening future 
retirees’ financial well-being). 
 16.  I say “ostensibly” because many such plans today allow participants to withdraw 
money before retirement. 
 17.  E.g., Andrew G. Biggs & Glenn R. Springstead, Alternate Measures of 
Replacement Rates for Social Security Benefits and Retirement Income, 68 SOC. SEC. BULL. 
(No. 2) 8, 14 (2008) (noting, in 2008, that a middle-income worker who is currently in her 
late thirties and retires in 2040 at age sixty-five could expect to receive benefits equal to 
fifty-five percent of her average income for the five years prior to retirement). 
 18.  THE BD. OF TRS., supra note 1, at 42 (explaining that the Social Security trust funds 
invest surpluses earned in prior years and use those surpluses, as well as accumulated 
interest, to compensate for shortfalls in current and future years). 
 19.  Id. at 3. 
 20.  Id. at 9. 
 21.  See supra note 2. 
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2035.
22
  This has created the widespread belief that something must be 
done about Medicare:  That something is likely to be either a reduction in 
benefits, which would increase costs for retirees, or the conversion of 
Medicare to a voucher program, which would increase costs for retirees 
and transfer the risk of health care cost inflation from the federal 
government to retirees.
23
 
These likely reductions in already-modest government programs make 
private pensions and individual savings increasingly important components 
of retirement security.  Yet American households today seem singularly 
unprepared for retirement.  As of 2009, only 14% of middle-income 
households held any stocks, only 14% held any bonds (including savings 
bonds), and only 7% held any investment funds, including mutual funds 
(outside of retirement accounts).
24
  Of middle-income households, only 
58% had retirement accounts, and the median value of those accounts was 
only $26,000.
25
  Even for households (of all incomes) headed by someone 
between the ages of 57 and 66, only 63% held any retirement accounts, 
with a median value of less than $86,000.
26
 
The most important factor affecting a person’s retirement assets is 
probably the amount she saves while working.  But another important 
factor is how she invests that money.  In the first decades after World War 
II, employer-sponsored pensions primarily followed the defined benefit 
model, where the employer promised to pay the employee a specific annual 
benefit upon retirement.  The employer invested assets in the current period 
to fund those future benefits and bore the resulting investment risk.  The 
past half-century, however, has seen a major shift from defined benefit to 
defined contribution pensions.
27
  In the latter, the employer or the employee 
puts a specific amount of money in an individual account in the current 
period, and the employee receives that money (with investment gains) upon 
retirement.  As a result, the employee bears the investment risk, not the 
employer. 
It is theoretically possible for a defined contribution pension plan to be 
managed by the employer or by a professional investment adviser, but in 
 
 22.  The 6.7% figure is from the “alternative fiscal scenario,” which incorporates likely 
changes to current law.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2011 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 
8 (2011). 
 23.  See supra note 5. 
 24.  Bricker et al., supra note 4, app. tbl.2A. 
 25.  Bricker et al., supra note 4, app. tbl.2A-B. 
 26.  Bricker et al., supra note 4, app. tbl.2A-B. 
 27.  See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 
470 (2004) (noting that both the number of defined benefit plans and the number of 
participants in these plans have declined while the number of defined contribution plans has 
grown, signaling a “reversal of historic patterns”). 
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practice most such plans are “participant-directed,” meaning that the 
employee can choose from a list of investment options.  The growth of the 
defined contribution plan has been accompanied by the growth of IRAs, 
which were created by ERISA to make pension benefits portable.
28
  Instead 
of having to take a taxable distribution of her pension benefits upon leaving 
an employer, a departing employee could roll her distribution into an IRA, 
which would continue to generate tax-free investment returns until 
retirement.  Current law also allows people who are not participants in 
employer-sponsored retirement plans to contribute pre-tax money to IRAs, 
thereby receiving the same tax benefits as those provided by defined 
contribution plans.
29
 
In 2010, American households had $4.5 trillion invested in employer-
sponsored defined contribution plans and $4.7 trillion in IRAs.
30
  The large 
and growing importance of these plans means that an individual’s 
retirement income increasingly depends in part on her investment choices.  
And today, more money in retirement accounts is invested in mutual funds 
than in any other investment vehicle—often, in the case of employer-
sponsored plans, because employees have no other viable investment 
options.
31
 
B. The Importance of Mutual Funds 
In general, a mutual fund is a legal entity, organized either as a 
corporation or as a business trust, with the sole function of investing in 
other assets.
32
  The fund issues shares that are bought by fund investors and 
that investors can sell back to the fund.  Each share is a proportional claim 
on the assets in the fund and is priced based on the fund’s net asset value; 
that is, fund shares never trade at a discount or a premium to the assets held 
by the fund.  The assets of the fund are managed by the fund adviser, a 
company external to the fund itself, which is paid directly by the fund for 
its services.  In other words, buying shares in a mutual fund is a way of 
hiring someone else to manage your money. 
 
 28.  26 U.S.C. §§ 402, 408 (2006) (amending the Internal Revenue Code); see Zelinsky, 
supra note 27, at 472–75, (discussing the creation of the IRA). 
 29.  There are other flavors of tax-advantaged retirement savings, such as non-
deductible (after-tax) IRAs and Roth IRAs. 
 30.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 101. 
 31.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 112; see also INV. CO. INST., 2010 INVESTMENT 
COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
INDUSTRY 103 (50th ed. 2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2010_factbook.pdf. 
 32.  See Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered 
Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421 (1988) (discussing the legal structure of 
mutual funds). 
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On balance, the existence of mutual funds is probably a good thing.  
Without mutual funds, people who wanted to invest in securities would be 
forced to buy individual stocks and bonds, incurring transaction and search 
costs.  To obtain the benefits of diversification, they would have to buy 
large numbers of securities, which would be particularly inconvenient for 
small investors.  Instead, an individual investor today can buy a small 
number of mutual funds or a single fund that provides a high degree of 
diversification at relatively low cost, making investing both simpler and 
cheaper.  Mutual funds effectively allow small investors to pool their 
money and thereby gain some of the advantages of large investors. 
Mutual funds are convenient and widely used, currently holding $11.8 
trillion in investments in the United States.
33
  They are also the building 
blocks out of which much of our country’s retirement “system” is built.  
While Social Security does not invest in mutual funds, both defined 
contribution pensions and individual savings largely take the form of 
mutual fund investments.  Mutual funds make up the largest single portion 
of the IRA market, with $2.2 trillion out of the total $4.7 trillion market.
34
  
And because mutual funds are the most popular investment options 
included in defined contribution pension plans, they claim $2.5 trillion of 
the $4.7 trillion in those plans.
35
  For most households, a majority of their 
financial assets are invested in mutual funds,
36
 and for 74% of households, 
retirement saving is the primary goal of their mutual fund investments.
37
  
The prevalence of mutual funds means that individuals’ investment 
outcomes–and their retirement security–are largely in the hands of the 
mutual fund industry. 
C. Good and Bad Funds 
The biggest threat to investors posed by mutual funds is the expenses 
associated with actively managed funds.
38
  Because a mutual fund is an 
 
 33.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 9 (referring to “open-ended” mutual funds, which 
allow investors to redeem their shares at net asset value). 
 34.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 112. 
 35.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 118. 
 36.  Characteristics of Mutual Funds Investors, 2010, 19 RES. FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. 
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2010, at 5. 
 37.  Id. at 7. 
 38.  Mutual funds have also made headlines for illegal behavior, including late trading 
(allowing certain clients to place orders after the day’s closing price has been calculated) 
and market timing (allowing certain clients to make frequent trades even in violation of a 
fund’s official disclosure documents).  See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Investment 
Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
61, 75–78 (2010) (presenting multiple ways in which investment advisors might take 
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investment vehicle, the main characteristic customers should care about is 
the net investment returns that they will receive.  Net investment returns 
equal gross investment returns (performance of the fund’s investments) 
minus expenses (including sales loads, fund management fees, and 
administrative fees).  Mutual funds can be divided into two categories:  
passively managed (index) funds and actively managed funds.  Index funds 
attempt to replicate the performance of a market index, such as the S&P 
500, sometimes simply by buying all the securities that make up the index.  
Therefore, they generally deliver gross investment returns that are very 
close to those of the market segment tracked by the index, and they usually 
have low expenses.  In an active fund, the fund manager makes decisions to 
buy and sell securities with the intention of beating the market.  Active 
funds generally have higher expenses than index funds for at least three 
reasons:  higher costs of active stock-picking, the ability to charge higher 
prices because they offer a more differentiated product (stock-picking 
expertise), and higher transaction costs due to more frequent buying and 
selling.
39
 
The attraction of actively managed funds is that they hold out the 
promise of beating the market.  After all, if some fund manager is smart 
enough to beat the market by five percentage points per year, then it makes 
sense to pay one percentage point more in expenses to obtain her services.  
The problem is that there are very few, if any, fund managers smart enough 
to consistently beat the market in a meaningful sense—that is, managers 
whose expected gross returns, on a risk-adjusted basis,
40
 are higher not only 
than those of an index fund, but high enough to compensate for higher 
costs.  And since funds disclose their past returns, not their expected 
returns (which can be difficult to calculate with any accuracy), it is very 
hard, if not impossible, to identify those fund managers in advance.  A 
large majority of investors would be better off simply buying index funds, 
pocketing the market return, and saving the expenses. 
The superiority of index funds over active funds for the ordinary 
 
advantage of the current trading system); Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of 
Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. REV. 133 (2005) (detailing the evolution of the mutual 
fund industry and unscrupulous actions taken by those in the field); Martin E. Lybecker, 
Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed Concept That Deserves 
Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1061–79 (2005) (highlighting specific 
scandals among mutual fund groups during from 2003 to 2004). 
 39.  Technically, transaction costs are already included in a fund’s gross investment 
return (before deductions for fund expenses), so a fund’s published expense ratio does not 
capture the full costs of active management; in some cases, transaction costs can exceed a 
fund’s published expense ratios.  See Hurst, supra note 38, at 146–47. 
 40.  In general, asset classes with higher risk (higher variance of outcomes) have higher 
returns, so one way to increase expected returns is simply to invest in riskier assets. 
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investor is illustrated by the efficient market hypothesis—one of the central 
propositions of modern finance theory—but does not actually depend on it.  
That hypothesis, most closely associated with University of Chicago 
economist Eugene Fama,
41
 holds, in short, that no one can beat the market.  
The basic principle is simple:  In a highly liquid market, where investors 
can trade securities quickly and at low cost, prices will rapidly change to 
incorporate all available relevant information.  Otherwise, traders would be 
able to make profits on new information, and their very activity would 
bring prices into line with that information.  If no one can beat the market 
consistently, then there is no point in investing in active funds.  Any fund 
that attempts to beat the market is at least as likely to fail as to succeed, so 
at best it will have the same expected gross returns as an index fund, but 
with higher expenses.  The performance of funds that do beat the market 
year after year can be explained as the result of simple chance:  In any 
universe including thousands of funds, many will beat the market in a given 
year, and some will beat the market for several years in succession. 
The efficient market hypothesis is one of the most tested propositions 
in modern finance.  Recent research indicates that there are probably some 
fund managers who can beat the market (that is, their superior results 
cannot be explained simply as the product of random chance).
42
  
Unfortunately, they are hard if not impossible to pick out from the legions 
of fund managers out there.  In general, according to Mark Carhart: 
Persistence in mutual fund performance does not reflect superior 
stock-picking skill.  Rather, common factors in stock returns and 
persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction 
costs explain almost all of the predictability in mutual fund 
returns.  Only the strong, persistent underperformance by the 
worst-return mutual funds remains anomalous.
43
 
Eugene Fama and Kenneth French acknowledge that some fund 
 
 41.  Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF 
ECONOMIC CALAMITIES, 85–96 (2009) (examining the efficient market hypothesis through 
historical examples); JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF 
RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 89–107 (2009) (discussing Fama and the 
efficient market hypothesis). 
 42.  See, e.g., Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 
57, 80 (1997) (finding “very slight evidence” of mutual fund manager skill); Robert 
Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a 
Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551 (2006) (finding that the top mutual funds in recent years 
do have positive performance that persists at least one year into the future); Eugene F. Fama 
& Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J. 
FIN. 1915 (2010) (finding that some managers have sufficient skill to cover their costs). 
 43.  Carhart, supra note 42, at 57. 
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managers have market-beating skill, but nevertheless find that “true [alpha] 
in net returns to investors is negative for most if not all active funds . . . .”
44
  
Significantly for ordinary investors, “if many managers have sufficient skill 
to cover costs, they are hidden by the mass of managers with insufficient 
skill.”
45
  Since the mid-1960s, many studies have shown that active funds, 
in general, do worse than the market as a whole.
46
  As of mid-2010, a 
majority of actively managed funds had lower returns than their relevant 
benchmark indexes in every single fund category over one, three, and five 
years.
47
  Even if the efficient market hypothesis is not strictly true, it is true 
enough for the practical purposes of ordinary investors. 
If stock-picking ability is impossible to identify, then the sole 
determinant of fund returns that investors can control is expenses.  For 
those who think that stock picking is irrelevant, expenses are the main 
determinant of performance.
48
  For those who believe in stock picking 
ability, much, if not all of it, is absorbed by expenses.
49
  Even worse, 
expenses are negatively correlated with gross returns, not just net returns; 
 
 44.  Fama & French, supra note 42, at 1916.  “Alpha” is the conventional designation 
for returns that are due to fund manager skill, as opposed to beta, the designation for returns 
that are due to the performance of the overall market. 
 45.  Fama & French, supra note 42, at 1916. 
 46.  E.g., William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. BUS. 119, 137 (1966) 
(finding that a sample of stock mutual funds underperformed the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average on a risk-adjusted basis); see also Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The 
Relation Between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153 
(2009) (finding underperformance of twenty-one to seventy-one basis points, depending on 
the set of controls); Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed 
Funds, 52 J. FIN. 783, 787 (1996) (finding that actively managed funds had annual returns 
that were sixty-five basis points below the applicable market indexes); Michael C. Jensen, 
Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios, 42 J. BUS. 
167, 239 (1969) (finding that mutual funds, on a risk-adjusted basis, had lower net returns 
than the market as a whole); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical 
Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J. 
FIN. 1655 (2000) (finding that actively managed funds hold stocks that outperform the 
market, but on a net basis underperform indexes by one percent).  Note that both Gruber and 
Wermers argue that some fund managers do have superior stock-picking ability, but still 
recognize that funds as a whole do worse than the market. 
 47.  Standard & Poor’s Indices Versus Active Funds Scorecard: Mid-Year 2010, S&P 
INDICES: RESEARCH & DESIGN (S&P Indices, New York), 2010, at 3. 
 48.  “In the absence of forecasting ability, all one need do is generate substantial 
expenses through time to insure inferior performance.”  Jensen, supra note 46, at 236; see 
also Sharpe, supra note 46, at 137 (finding that mutual funds do about as well as the Dow 
Jones index before expenses, but worse than the index after accounting for expenses). 
 49.  Wermers, supra note 46, at 1690 (finding that expenses and transaction costs 
outweigh stock picking ability); see also Fama & French, supra note 42, at 1931–34 
(finding that many managers have skill sufficient to cover their transaction costs, but few 
have skill sufficient to cover the other costs included in fund expense ratios). 
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that is, higher expenses are more likely to buy you a bad fund manager.
50
  
For the ordinary investor, then, the dominant strategy is simple:  buy index 
funds with low expenses.
51
 
Yet investors continue to invest in expensive, actively managed funds.  
Only 14.5% of stock mutual fund investments are in index funds.
52
  While 
broad stock market index funds are available with expense ratios of 10 
basis points or less,
53
 in 2010, the average stock mutual fund charged 145 
basis points for its efforts to beat the market.  Even when funds were 
weighted by assets, the average stock mutual fund expense ratio was 84 
basis points.
54
  The average mutual fund also charged a 1% up-front “sales 
load,” which is a fee to invest in the fund.
55
  This boosted the effective 
annual cost of the average stock fund to 95 basis points.
56
  People who buy 
mutual funds through their employer pension plans do little better.  As of 
2009, the asset-weighted average expense ratio for 401(k) plan investments 
in stock mutual funds was 74 basis points, while the comparable figure for 
all stock mutual funds was 86 basis points.
57
  Given that asset-weighting 
increases the importance of large 401(k) plans, which should be able to 
exert the same influence on fund management fees as institutional 
investors, an advantage of 12 basis points is only a paltry improvement.  In 
addition, investors in mutual funds receive returns that are considerably 
worse than the returns of those funds themselves because they buy and sell 
fund shares at the wrong time—buying into funds that have recently done 
well and selling out of funds that have done poorly.
58
  From 1991 through 
2010, investors in stock mutual funds earned an annual return of 3.83%, 
while the S&P 500 Index returned 9.14% annually.
59
  Over that period, 
 
 50.  Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdú, supra note 46. 
 51.  Although index funds should have lower expenses than actively managed funds, 
some index funds charge much higher fees than others. 
 52.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 33. 
 53.  See Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund Admiral Shares, supra note 7.  
 54.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 66. 
 55.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 65. 
 56.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 64. 
 57.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 110.  The asset-weighted average expense ratio for 
stock funds was eighty-six basis points in 2009 and eighty-four basis points in 2010. 
 58.  Christine Benz, How Did Investors Really Do?, MORNINGSTAR (Nov. 13, 2006, 
6:00 AM), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=178504. 
 59.  Press Release, Dalbar, Inc., Investors Can Manage Psyche to Capture Alpha: 
Dalbar Study of Investor Returns Offers Ways to Improve Investor’s Alpha (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.dalbar.com/Portals/dalbar/cache/News/PressReleases/pressrelease040111.pdf.  
After fund expenses, an investor in an S&P 500 index fund would have earned an annual 
return of about 9%.  The period from 1991–2010 was not an unusual one:  For the 20 years 
ending in 1998, the corresponding gap was 10.65%.  Press Release, Dalbar, Inc., Investors 
Regain Footing: Dalbar Study Finds That Market Experience and Target Date Funds Lead 
to Success (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.dalbar.com/Portals/dalbar/cache/News/PressRelease 
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$10,000 invested in the S&P 500 Index would have grown to $137,885; the 
same amount earning 3.83% per year would have grown to only $30,881.  
Expensive, actively managed funds are a major threat to the retirement 
security of millions of middle-class Americans. 
People make bad decisions in general, particularly when it comes to 
investing.  The behavioral economics literature is replete with examples of 
irrational investing choices.
60
  The idea that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to beat the market consistently is not intuitive; nor is the idea that repeated 
positive results are most often due to chance.  Perhaps most difficult to 
accept is the idea that higher prices do not connote quality, but just the 
opposite.  As a result, investors tend to chase returns, buying asset classes 
(e.g., stocks), certain types of funds (e.g., technology stock funds), and 
specific funds based on their past performance—all strategies that tend to 
have a negative impact on returns. 
But we also have to ask who gains from the widespread belief that it is 
possible to beat the market.  “Why do Congress and the SEC perpetuate 
these myths?” A.C. Pritchard asks.  “Because the financial services 
industry requires these myths for its very existence.  If investors were to 
switch en masse to index funds and other forms of passive investment, the 
Wall Street-industrial complex would crumble.”
61
  Mutual fund companies 
set out to exploit the human foibles that cause people to invest in active 
funds.  Because fund companies make more money from high-expense 
funds than from low-expense funds, all other things being equal, they have 
an obvious incentive to create and market high-expense funds.  Fund 
marketing centers on past performance.  So, for example, a fund company 
can quietly launch several similar funds and wait a few years, after which 
some are likely (through luck if nothing else) to have beaten the market;
62
 
then it can shut down the losers and actively market the winners to a 
 
s/pressrelease20100331.pdf. 
 60.  For brief reviews of the major findings, see Birdthistle, supra note 38, at 80–84; 
Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 
401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 378–81 
(2002). 
 61.  A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1073, 1089 (2005). 
 62.  From 1995 to 1997, the Van Kampen Growth Fund was a small fund that was 
closed to the public.  It achieved stellar returns because its sponsor, Van Kampen Funds, 
gave it allocations in thirty-one hot initial public offerings.  Van Kampen Funds then began 
marketing the Growth Fund to the public.  Van Kampen Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 23,996, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1819, 70 SEC 
Docket 1213 (Sept. 8, 1999); see also Dreyfus Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7857, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 24,450, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1870, 
72 SEC Docket 946 (May 10, 2000) (imposing sanctions on Dreyfus for failing to disclose 
the “large impact of the IPOs on the fund’s performance”). 
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largely unsuspecting public.  Fund companies also advertise the track 
records and pedigrees of their fund managers, using celebrity to attract 
investors who believe that some people must be better at stock picking than 
other people. 
Although people make bad choices, perhaps we should allow them to 
do so.  On one theory, summarized by Judge Frank Easterbrook in the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., mutual funds 
compete in a free market, so people can look out for their own interests and 
we should let the chips fall where they may: 
New entry is common, and funds can attract money only by 
offering a combination of service and management that investors 
value, at a price they are willing to pay.  Mutual funds come 
much closer to the model of atomistic competition than do most 
other markets. . . .  A recent, careful study concludes that 
thousands of mutual funds are plenty, that investors can and do 
protect their interests by shopping, and that regulating advisory 
fees through litigation is unlikely to do more good than harm.
63
 
According to Easterbrook, as long as there is sufficient competition, 
consumers will only buy into a fund if it provides sufficient “service and 
management.”  Therefore, when investors overpay for active funds, they 
are getting something for their money, even if it isn’t superior investment 
returns.  The study cited by Easterbrook is a 2007 article by John Coates 
and Glenn Hubbard that similarly focused on the existence of competition:  
Coates and Hubbard provided evidence that money tends to flow from 
mutual funds with high expenses to funds with low expenses, which 
implies that competition is working as it should.
64
 
Even if we accept its premises, however, Easterbrook’s argument 
constitutes a rather pallid defense of the status quo.  He relies on the mere 
existence of competition rather than defending its substantive outcome:  
large investments in active funds with high fees.  In their article, Coates 
and Hubbard actually show that funds with lower expenses do have higher 
 
 63.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated and 
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010); see also M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2010) (“The market for mutual funds is mature and competitive, 
so it strains credulity to claim that advisers can get away with charging supracompetitive 
fees, let alone to contend that courts are equipped to efficiently police abuses.”). 
 64.  John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: 
Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 180–83 (2007).  Coates and 
Hubbard’s findings have been vigorously contested.  See, e.g., John P. Freeman et al, 
Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. 
REV. 83 (2008) (“The current system for evaluating mutual fund advisory fees is a 
failure. . . .  [It has] allowed fund fees to float even higher, free from the competitive 
market’s gravitational pull”). 
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net returns, and this is, in fact, at the crux of their analysis:  Cheaper funds 
perform better, which is why they grow in size, which is what proves that 
competition is working.
65
  But competition does not prove that a market is 
efficient, let alone that it produces outcomes that are desirable either for 
individuals or for society as a whole.
66
 
The fact that, in a competitive market, some people make poor choices 
that cause them to lose money may not in the abstract constitute a public 
policy concern, and this Article does not address the issue of what mutual 
funds people select for their taxable, non-retirement investments.  When 
poor decisions are made in a market that enjoys tax preferences precisely 
because it is intended to further the public goal of expanding retirement 
security, however, it does raise a significant policy question.  By providing 
valuable tax benefits to retirement accounts, the federal government is 
effectively a co-investor in those accounts; it hopes to gain “returns” in the 
form of lower poverty rates among elderly Americans.  Even if some 
people are able to pick mutual funds that do beat the market, whether 
through luck or through skill, they are outnumbered by people whose fund 
investments trail the market.  In the aggregate, then, active funds constitute 
a drain on Americans’ retirement savings.  The question becomes even 
more pressing in the context of employer-sponsored retirement plans, 
where employees cannot access the free market directly, but are instead 
restricted to the investment options prescribed by plan administrators. 
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING REGULATORY APPROACHES 
The problem of high mutual fund fees is not new.  This Part describes 
the two main approaches through which Congress and plaintiffs’ attorneys 
 
 65.  Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 180. 
 66.  Easterbrook also dismisses the argument that fund companies can prey on 
unsophisticated consumers:  “The sophisticated investors who do shop create a competitive 
pressure that protects the rest.”  Jones, 527 F.3d at 634 (citing Alan Schwartz & Louis L. 
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties 
and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983)).  Several economists, however, have 
argued that sophisticated and unsophisticated investors essentially shop in different markets, 
allowing fund companies to market expensive funds to the unsophisticated.  See, e.g., Susan 
E.K. Christoffersen & David K. Musto, Demand Curves and the Pricing of Money 
Management, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1499 (2002) (finding that if a fund performed poorly, its 
sophisticated investors would flee to other funds, leaving only price-insensitive customers 
and allowing the fund to charge high prices); Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdú, supra note 46 
(finding evidence to support Christoffersen and Musto’s explanation and an alternative 
explanation:  fund companies create funds they know will have lower expected performance 
and specifically target unsophisticated investors; Gruber, supra note 46, at 807 (arguing that 
bad funds exist because they collect money from unsophisticated investors and people 
restricted by their pension plans to underperforming funds). 
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have attempted to protect investors from expensive funds—regulation of 
mutual funds under the 1940 Act and of employer-sponsored pension plans 
under ERISA—and explains why they have generally failed. 
A. Mutual Fund Regulation 
As its supporters like to point out, the mutual fund industry is highly 
regulated.
67
  Mutual funds and their relationship with fund advisers are 
subject to the 1940 Act and to the Investment Company Amendments Act 
of 1970 (“1970 Amendments”), which placed additional fee-related 
requirements on mutual funds.
68
  Current law, however, has proven 
ineffective at limiting mutual fund expenses or driving bad funds from the 
market. 
The 1940 Act dictated a corporation-like governance structure for all 
mutual funds, regardless of whether they were constituted as corporations 
or trusts.  Each fund has a board of directors that is elected by shareholders 
(investors) in the fund; at least forty percent of those directors must be 
“disinterested” parties.
69
  The board’s responsibilities include approving the 
contract for investment services between the fund and the fund adviser.
70
  
Section 17(h) of the 1940 Act makes directors liable to fund shareholders 
for “willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard 
of the duties involved . . . .”
71
  Section 36 of the Act, in its original version, 
prohibited breaches of fiduciary duty involving “gross misconduct or gross 
 
 67.  E.g., Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 153 (arguing against additional 
regulation of mutual funds, “already the most heavily regulated sector of the financial 
services industry”).  See generally Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 160–63 (explaining 
how law and regulation promote competition in the mutual fund industry); Jill E. Fisch, 
Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–83 
(2010) (discussing the regulation of mutual funds, money market funds, exchange-traded 
funds, and 401(k) plans); Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary 
Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of 
Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1019–25 (2005) (discussing litigation as a 
remedy for fiduciary breaches by mutual fund directors); John Morley & Quinn Curtis, 
Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual 
Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 92–98 (2010) (summarizing the regulation of mutual funds). 
 68.  Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 69.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006).  In practice, certain SEC rules make it attractive for 
mutual funds to have boards with a majority of disinterested members.  Alan R. Palmiter, 
The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 169 (2006). 
 70.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006).  The contract must be approved by a majority of the 
disinterested directors.  For a summary of directors’ duties in general, see Jones et al., supra 
note 32, at 435–38. 
 71.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (2006). 
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abuse of trust”; this prohibition applied to fund advisers as well.
72
  The 
1970 Amendments lowered the section 36 standard from “gross misconduct 
or gross abuse of trust” to “personal misconduct.”
73
  The Amendments also 
introduced section 36(b), which imposes on fund advisers “a fiduciary duty 
with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” paid to the adviser 
or any of its affiliates, backed by a private right of action.
74
  Approval of an 
investment services agreement by the fund’s board of directors does not 
automatically shield a fund adviser from liability.
75
 
This all sounds good:  The board should negotiate with the fund 
adviser to ensure that the fund does not pay excessive fees, and the fund 
adviser also has a fiduciary duty to the fund and its shareholders.  The 
structure set up by the 1940 Act, however, has not prevented the 
domination of the fund industry by expensive mutual funds for two major 
reasons.  First, the corporate governance structure of mutual funds is deeply 
flawed.
76
  In theory, the investment services contract must be approved at 
least once by a majority of the shareholders.
77
  In practice, however, mutual 
funds are created by the fund advisers themselves and hence the contract 
can be approved before the fund is opened to the public; from that point it 
only needs to be approved annually by the disinterested members of the 
board.
78
  And because the fund adviser creates the fund in the first place, 
the adviser is the only initial shareholder and can handpick the initial board.  
The statutory definition of a “disinterested” director is weaker than the 
common law definition of an independent director,
79
 and therefore 
“disinterested” board members “are typically securities industry executives 
and professionals whose firms provide direct or indirect services to mutual 
funds.”
80
 
Second, the standards for breach of the board’s or the fund adviser’s 
fiduciary responsibilities have been set sufficiently high to protect mutual 
funds from claims of excessive fees.  From 1940 to 1970: 
 
 72.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006).  For the original version of this section, see 
Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1021. 
 73.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2006). 
 74.  Id. § 80a-35(b).  Because section 36(b) only authorizes suits against an actual 
“recipient of such compensation or payments,” it is targeted solely at fund advisers, not 
directors.  Id. § 80a-35(b)(3) (2006). 
 75.  Id. § 80a-35(b)(2) (2006). 
 76.  See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 69, at 166 (explaining that the structure of the board 
is flawed because it is “composed of part-timers” who “operate without meaningful 
oversight”). 
 77.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (2006). 
 78.  Id. §§ 80a-15(a)(2), 80a-15(c). 
 79.  Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee 
Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497 (2008). 
 80.  Palmiter, supra note 69, at 170. 
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[S]hareholders challenging investment adviser fees under state 
law were required to meet “common-law standards of corporate 
waste, under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be 
approved unless the court deemed it ‘unconscionable’ or 
‘shocking,’” and “security holders challenging adviser fees under 
the [Investment Company Act] itself had been required to prove 
gross abuse of trust.”
81
 
The prevalence of expensive mutual funds motivated Congress to pass 
the 1970 Amendments.
82
  But despite Congress’s intentions, section 36(b) 
has done little to deter excessive fees, which is not particularly surprising.  
It is far from clear what it means that a fund adviser “shall be deemed to 
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for 
services,”
83
 nor is it obvious whether this new fiduciary duty has 
substantive content or whether, as Easterbrook argued in Jones, it is simply 
procedural.
84
  Because of these ambiguities, the application of section 
36(b)–and hence the regulation of mutual fund fees—has rested largely in 
the hands of the courts, which have never granted a final judgment to 
plaintiffs under this section.
85
 
Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones, the leading case 
on section 36(b) was Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch, a Second Circuit case 
from 1982, which established a hurdle nearly as difficult for plaintiffs to 
overcome as the one that predated the 1970 Amendments.
86
  The short 
reading of Gartenberg is that it allows any mutual fund fee that is not “so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the 
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length 
bargaining.”
87
  On its face, this test provides judicial cover for any fee that 
is within shouting distance of industry averages, since a plaintiff must 
prove both that the fee is unreasonably high and that it could not have been 
negotiated fairly.  As Donald Langevoort has written, “[t]his test resembles 
the state law test for corporate waste, even though the legislative history 
 
 81.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S.Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 540 n.12 (1984)); see also Sarah 
Cogan & Jonathan Youngwood, Determining Breach of Duty on Fees Charged by 
Investment Advisers, 243 N.Y.L.J., Jun. 18, 2010, at 4 (discussing the Gartenberg standard). 
 82.  Fisch, supra note 67, at 1972. 
 83.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 
1418 (2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b) (2006)). 
 84.  Justice Alito deemed the meaning of section 36(b) “hardly pellucid.”  Jones, 130 
S.Ct. at 1426. 
 85.  Henderson, supra note 63, at 1033. 
 86.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 87.  Id. at 928 (citing Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
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behind section 36(b) explicitly wanted something more than a waste test.”
88
  
Nevertheless, Gartenberg was recognized by most circuit courts of appeals 
as the predominant standard for mutual fund fee cases,
89
 and its 
“disproportionately large” language played a major role in blunting 
challenges brought by fund shareholders. 
In Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., the Seventh Circuit attacked the 
Gartenberg standard,
90
 essentially holding that section 36(b) challenges 
should be evaluated solely on procedural grounds.  “A fiduciary must make 
full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on 
compensation.”
91
  The court also argued that the mutual fund market is 
competitive and that investors can protect their interests simply by moving 
their money from one fund to another.
92
  The Supreme Court, however, 
upheld Gartenberg, specifically endorsing its “so disproportionately large” 
formulation.
93
  Justice Alito’s opinion defines a breach of fiduciary duty as 
a transaction that is “outside the range that arm’s-length bargaining would 
produce,”
94
 encourages “a measure of deference” to the decisions of 
disinterested directors on the fund’s board,
95
 and warns that “the standard 
for fiduciary breach under § 36(b) does not call for judicial second-
guessing of informed board decisions.”
96
  Because it affirms the 
Gartenberg standard and defers to mutual fund boards, the Supreme 
Court’s opinion is unlikely to change actual industry behavior.
97
 
For some commentators, that is just fine.  As discussed above, 
 
 88.  Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1024.  On closer reading, Gartenberg muddies its 
own waters, since it also states, “the test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a 
charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s length in light of all 
the surrounding circumstances,” which is not quite the same thing.  Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 
928. 
 89.  Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1425 (“[U]ntil the Seventh Circuit’s decision below, something 
of a consensus had developed regarding the standard set forth over 25 years ago in 
Gartenberg.”). 
 90.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are 
skeptical about Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.”). 
 91.  Id.  Although Judge Easterbrook recognized that “[i]t is possible to imagine 
compensation so unusual that a court will infer that deceit must have occurred, or that the 
persons responsible for decision have abdicated,” in that case, the disproportionately large 
fee is not itself the problem; the problem is the procedural flaw it implies.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 634. 
 93.  Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1426. 
 94.  Id. at 1427. 
 95.  Id. at 1428. 
 96.  Id. at 1430. 
 97.  The Court did say that it was appropriate to compare a mutual fund’s fees to the 
fees charged by the same fund adviser to its institutional clients.  Id. at 1428–29.  This 
comparison had been rejected by Gartenberg.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 
Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 930 n.3 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
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Easterbrook argued that high mutual fund fees are simply not a problem:  If 
people are paying the fees in a competitive market, they must be getting 
their money’s worth.  “The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote 
with their feet and dollars) . . . determine how much advisory services are 
worth.”
98
  But the empirical evidence, as summarized above,
99
 does not 
bear out this rosy view of the market:  While a few fund managers may be 
able to beat stock indexes, in general, fund expenses are strongly and 
negatively correlated with gross returns, let alone net returns.  Despite the 
existence of competition, many investors are paying whole percentage 
points or more in fees for services that provide them with negative value.
100
 
Some analysts have proposed various ways to strengthen the existing 
governance model for mutual funds, whether by requiring that seventy-five 
percent of fund directors be disinterested,
101
 mandating comparative 
disclosure of fund expenses to promote more effective board oversight,
102
 
holding disinterested directors to the standards required of independent 
directors in corporate law,
103
 or asking courts to show less deference to 
disinterested directors.
104
  Langevoort cautions, however, that “[i]n the 
absence of some means of forcing on the industry disinterested directors 
whose ideology is fiduciary rather than consumerist . . . the more 
reasonable legal reaction is to keep expectations in check.”
105
  Fund 
directors are not likely to be active defenders of investor interests, and that 
is unlikely to change, since investors can always sell their fund shares 
instead of expending effort in monitoring directors.
106
  Given that a mutual 
 
 98.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008); see also 
Henderson, supra note 63, at 1038–48 (arguing that the real problem is not mutual fund fees 
but value-destroying strike suits over fund fees by plaintiffs and their attorneys). 
 99.  See supra Part C. 
 100.  There is also a curious conceptual tension in Easterbrook’s argument.  If the prices 
of mutual funds are efficient, it is hard to argue that the prices of stocks are inefficient.  And 
if stock prices are efficient, then trying to beat the market is a fool’s errand. 
 101.  Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 
83 SEC Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004).  The SEC rules were effectively vacated by Chamber 
of Commerce of U.S. v. S.E.C., 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  There is some correlation 
between independent directors and better governance, but the causality could run either way.  
In Alan Palmiter’s words:  “[I]t seems more likely that investor-friendly management 
firms . . . are more likely to have truly independent directors . . . .”  Palmiter, supra note 69, 
at 200. 
 102.  James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral 
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 937 (2005). 
 103.  Johnson, supra note 79, at 530–31. 
 104.  Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1042. 
 105.  Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1041. 
 106.  Because investors can always sell their fund shares at net asset value, they are not 
locked into their investments and can simply sell out rather than engage in attempts at 
shareholder governance.  Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 162; see also Langevoort, 
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fund is typically the creature of its fund adviser and effectively captive to it 
since it has no independent operational existence, it is also debatable 
whether a fund’s board has the negotiating power necessary to adequately 
represent shareholder interests.
107
 
For these reasons, other commentators have argued that the current 
regulatory structure, based on the shareholder governance model, should be 
replaced with straightforward product regulation since investing in a 
mutual fund is more like buying an ordinary consumer product than it is 
like becoming a beneficiary of a trust or a shareholder in a corporation.  
“[M]utual fund investments are products,” writes Langevoort, “no 
different, really, from health care, insurance, bank deposits, residential real 
estate, and other important settings where consumers are often less than 
diligent.”
108
  Jill Fisch proposes to replace the structure created by the 1940 
Act with a new “conform or explain” model, in which a new federal agency 
would define standardized investment products and fund companies would 
have to explain how their products differed from those standards.
109
  John 
Morley and Quinn Curtis propose ending shareholder voting and 
eliminating the role of boards in setting fund strategy and negotiating fees.  
If price regulation were necessary, they would prefer “an honest-to-
goodness price cap enforceable by the government.”
110
 
Product-style regulation, however, would likely do little to protect 
ordinary investors from expensive active funds.  Typical regulatory 
regimes (such as those imposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration or the Food and Drug Administration) include minimum 
safety standards to protect the public from catastrophic harms and 
disclosure rules to further informed choice.
111
  With mutual funds, however, 
 
supra note 67 at 1031–32 (describing why corporate governance mechanisms do not work 
for mutual funds); Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 89 (explaining why investors prefer to 
simply sell their interests rather than invest effort in governance). 
 107.  Palmiter, supra note 69, at 173 (“[The board] has no realistic option (or threat) to 
hire a new investment adviser or management firm.”).  In practice, funds virtually never fire 
their fund advisers.  See Henderson, supra note 63, at 1032 (examining board practices, 
including an aversion to firing advisers); Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 95 (“As a 
practical matter, boards never fire management companies . . . .”). 
 108.  Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1037.  Indeed, Langevoort argues that this mindset 
has become prevalent in the industry, including among mutual fund directors, and is one 
reason why directors do not play their appointed role effectively.  Langevoort, supra note 
67, at 1041; see also Johnson, supra note 79, at 504 (“This arrangement has led some, 
including former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, to describe mutual funds as ‘products,’ not 
companies.”). 
 109.  Fisch, supra note 67, at 1961, 1966. 
 110.  Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 133, 139. 
 111.  FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353 (2011) (revising food 
safety regulation); 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.100-500 (2011) (providing safety standards for 
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neither high fund expenses nor the risks of active investing qualify as a 
catastrophic outcome.  This makes it difficult to envision a complete bar on 
active funds on traditional consumer protection grounds.
112
  Mutual funds 
are already required to disclose their expenses, but this has not deterred 
many investors from investing in unnecessarily expensive funds.  
Disclosures could certainly be improved,
113
 but even then they would be 
unlikely to blunt widespread investor enthusiasm for expensive funds 
because of the behavioral reasons described earlier.
114
  Only a small amount 
of optimism bias or a small amount of successful marketing is required to 
make an expensive fund seem like a smart investment decision.
115
  In 
summary, general mutual fund regulation is unlikely to shift the industry 
away from expensive, actively managed funds and toward low-cost index 
funds. 
B. Employer-Sponsored Pension Plan Regulation 
Employer-sponsored pensions have never been an entirely private 
affair.  The system of employment-based pension plans that evolved in the 
wake of World War II was a publicly subsidized complement to the still-
controversial Social Security system created in the New Deal.
116
  Employer 
pensions were the private sector’s preferred alternative to the prospect of 
Social Security becoming the nation’s sole provider of retirement 
insurance.  Employers both feared Social Security as an example of big 
government and wanted to use private pensions as a tool to attract workers, 
keep them loyal for long periods of time, and motivate them to retire when 
the time came.  As a result, in the decades following World War II, many 
large American companies created defined benefit pension plans that 
promised fixed retirement benefits to employees based mainly on their 
 
automobiles); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (mentioning 
automobile regulation); Fisch, supra note 67, at 2029 (mentioning pharmaceutical 
regulation); Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 131–32 (mentioning tire regulation). 
 112.  An absolute ban would also constitute a severe incursion into the free market for 
investment products and the freedom of the individual investor, which might be hard to 
justify given the evidence that at least some fund managers can deliver superior expected 
returns. 
 113.  For example, fund expenses could be presented along with information about the 
expenses charged by other similar funds. Cox & Payne, supra note 102, at 936. 
 114.  See supra Part C. 
 115.  See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing that mandated disclosure is ineffective and 
counterproductive). 
 116.  See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 85–173 (2002) (discussing the history 
of private pensions in the U.S.). 
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salaries and years of service. 
Beginning in the 1960s, concerns about these plans created increasing 
pressure for greater federal regulation, culminating in the passage of 
ERISA in 1974.  ERISA was largely concerned with problems specific to 
defined benefit plans, including underfunding of pensions, onerous vesting 
requirements that left many employees without benefits, and even outright 
theft.
117
  These problems were due in part to conflicts between the short-
term interests of employers and employees:  Most crudely, every dollar not 
paid in benefits was a dollar the company could keep for its shareholders.  
The solution devised by ERISA was to apply the principles of trust law, 
both by requiring all employer plans to constitute themselves as trusts,
118
 
and by imposing specific fiduciary duties, derived from trust law, on 
various people involved in managing a plan.
119
 
Retirement plan fiduciaries are defined to include anyone who 
“exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting 
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets.”
120
  In a defined benefit plan, those 
fiduciaries are responsible for investing the assets of the plan to ensure that 
there will be enough money to meet future obligations to plan 
participants—a role similar to that of a trustee managing the assets of a 
trust for its beneficiaries.  Like trustees, plan fiduciaries owe to plan 
participants and beneficiaries a duty of exclusive loyalty and a duty of care 
modeled on the “prudent man” standard,
121
 a staple of trust investment law 
in the United States since the early nineteenth century.
122
  In addition, 
ERISA imposes a duty of “diversifying the investments of the plan so as to 
minimize the risk of large losses,”
123
 a duty recognized by trust law since 
the late nineteenth century, though not codified in the Restatement of 
 
 117.  Stabile, supra note 60, at 366–67. 
 118.  29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006); see, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith 
Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000) (“The common law of trusts . . . offers a ‘starting 
point for analysis [of ERISA]’ . . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999)). 
 119.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006). 
 120.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2006). 
 121.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006) (“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the 
exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) 
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan . . . .  [A] fiduciary shall discharge 
his duties . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims . . . .”). 
 122.  John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust 
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644-46 (1996). 
 123.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
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Trusts until the early 1990s.
124
  These core fiduciary duties were intended to 
ensure that plan participants received the benefit of prudent, skilled 
investment management. 
Again, as with mutual fund regulation, this sounds good in principle.  
Yet, as mentioned above, participants in employer-sponsored defined 
contribution plans are just as likely as anyone else to invest in expensive 
active funds.  One underlying reason is that ERISA was written in a world 
of defined benefit plans, and many of its provisions only make sense in that 
context.  Since 1974, however, the pension landscape has shifted towards 
defined contribution plans, particularly after the Internal Revenue Code 
was amended in 1978 to allow what are now known as 401(k) plans.  The 
result is that employer-sponsored pensions are governed by a statute that 
was largely written for another age and another set of economic and legal 
challenges.  Several of the protections that ERISA purports to provide to 
plan participants, such as its funding requirements,
125
 are no longer relevant 
for defined contribution plans, while the protections that are necessary in a 
defined contribution world are absent. 
In particular, ERISA partially weakens the fiduciary duties that apply 
in the context of defined contribution plans that allow participants to make 
their own investment decisions.  ERISA section 404(c) relieves plan 
fiduciaries from liability for any losses resulting from the participant’s 
“exercise of control” over her account.
126
  This seems to imply that they can 
escape the duty of investing plan assets prudently simply by shifting that 
responsibility onto individual participants.  Combined with section 401(k) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, section 404(c) is a major reason why 
employers today favor participant-directed defined contribution plans.
127
 
Section 404(c) seems to make sense:  It says that if a plan participant 
makes a bad investment decision, her employer should not be liable for her 
 
 124.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(b) (2007); 
Langbein, supra note 122, at 646. 
 125.  29 U.S.C. §§1081–86 (2006). 
 126.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006).  On 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006) generally, 
see Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: 
Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 33–38 (2000) (detailing section 
404(c)’s implications for employers); C. Frederick Reish & Bruce L. Ashton, ERISA Section 
404(c): Shifting Fiduciary Liability in Participant-Directed Retirement Plans, 5 J. TAX’N 
EMP. BENEFITS 175 (1997) (describing the requirements for transferring certain investment 
responsibilities to employees); Stabile, supra note 60, at 365–78 (describing the historical 
underpinnings of section 404(c) and its practical consequences for employers and 
employees). 
 127.  See Stabile, supra note 60, at 366 (noting that “large numbers of employers have 
restructured their 401(k) plans” in order to reduce their liability for participants’ losses); 
Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 478–79 (discussing section 404(c) as lessening employers’ 
fiduciary burden). 
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losses.  But in practice, it has often been interpreted to mean that an 
employer can include just about any investment options in its defined 
contribution plan, including expensive active funds, without worrying 
about ERISA’s fiduciary duties.  Section 404(c) requires the Department of 
Labor to define when a participant has exercised control over her account.  
Under the current regulations, to qualify for the safe harbor, a plan must 
give the participant the ability to “exercise control over assets in his 
individual account” and must provide “a broad range of investment 
alternatives.”
128
  To meet the latter criterion, the plan must allow the 
participant to (a) “materially affect the potential return . . . and the degree 
of risk” of her investments; (b) choose from at least three diversified, 
dissimilar investment alternatives that together allow her to increase 
diversification, reduce risk, and reach any point on the appropriate range of 
the risk-return spectrum; and (c) diversify her holdings to “minimize the 
risk of large losses.”
129
  These regulations can be met by offering at least 
three different, diversified mutual funds.  In terms of relevant costs, the 
definition of a “broad range of investment alternatives” does not mention 
investment expenses, while the definition of “control” allows a plan to 
“impose[] charges for reasonable expenses.”
130
  A set of expensive, actively 
managed mutual funds would seem to comply with the regulations. 
The courts have generally held that expensive mutual funds are 
compatible with the regulations and do not constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duty.
131
  In Hecker v. Deere & Co., the Seventh Circuit rejected an 
excessive fee claim because the plan in question offered more than twenty 
mutual funds, including some with low fees, and also allowed participants 
to select from over two thousand other funds through Fidelity’s 
BrokerageLink service.
132
  The court justified the funds’ fees by appealing 
to the market,
133
 a justification that applies to all fees charged by all funds 
open to retail investors.  In other cases, district courts have endorsed plans 
because they included a few low-cost funds along with the allegedly 
 
 128.  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1). 
 129.  Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i). 
 130.  Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(A).  Given its context, however, this language should 
only apply to reasonable expenses for executing transactions.  That would still leave the 
regulation silent on the topic of investment management expenses. 
 131.  See Ellen M. Doyle & Stephen M. Pincus, Restoring Retirement Nest Eggs, TRIAL 
Apr. 2009, at 46, 46–47 (citing claims that made allegations of excessive fund fees). 
 132.  Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The fact that it is 
possible that some other funds might have had even lower ratios is beside the point . . . .”). 
 133.  Id. (noting that “all of these funds were also offered to investors in the general 
public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the backdrop of market 
competition”). 
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expensive ones,
134
 because the funds in question were typical of those 
included in similar plans,
135
 or, because the funds were selected through an 
adequately thorough process.
136
 
Plaintiffs have had slightly more success when linking high fund 
expenses to failures of disclosure, arguing that a participant cannot exercise 
meaningful control over her account if she does not have adequate 
information.  The regulations require that the participant receive “sufficient 
information to make informed investment decisions with regard to 
investment alternatives available under the plan.”
137
  Some courts have held 
that simply disclosing all applicable expenses
138
 is sufficient to insulate a 
plan against challenge.  In Hecker, for example, the complaint alleged that 
one Fidelity subsidiary, the trustee of the retirement plans, received 
payments from another Fidelity subsidiary that managed money for funds 
included in those plans; according to the allegation, the trustee used those 
payments to discount the administrative fee that it charged to the employer.  
In other words, the employer saved money by allowing the trustee to make 
money off of plan participants via the revenue-sharing arrangement.
139
  The 
Seventh Circuit, however, held that there was no duty to disclose the 
revenue-sharing arrangement because it was not material.
140
  In Braden v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., by contrast, the plaintiffs alleged that mutual funds 
were included in their plans because the funds made payments to Merrill 
Lynch, the plan trustee and administrator.
141
  The Eighth Circuit agreed that 
information about revenue sharing could be material because it “could 
influence a reasonable participant in evaluating his or her options under the 
 
 134.  Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098, 2010 WL 1688540, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 
2010). 
 135.  Kanawi v. Bechtel Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 136.  Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., No. 3:06cv1494 (WWE), 2009 WL 535779, at *10 
(D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2009); Kanawi, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
 137.  29 C.F.R. § 2550-404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B). 
 138.  The regulations specifically require detailed disclosure of administrative expenses 
(charged at the plan level), individual expenses (charged at the individual account level), 
and fees and expenses associated with each investment alternative.  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-
5(c)(2), (c)(3), and (d)(1). 
 139.  Hecker, 556 F.3d at 578. 
 140.  Id. at 585–86.  Other courts have similarly ruled that revenue sharing agreements 
do not need to be disclosed to plan participants.  See Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098, 
2010 WL 1688540, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2010) (holding revenue sharing arrangement 
details to be irrelevant to proper execution of fiduciary duties); Taylor, 2009 WL at *12–13 
(ruling that revenue sharing fees paid by participants through administrative fees, rather than 
by the employer, need not be disclosed); Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 06-04305-CV-NKL, 
2008 WL 379666, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2008) (agreeing with Eighth Circuit precedent 
in holding that employers have no duty to disclose trustees’ revenue sharing arrangements). 
 141.  Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 589–90 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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Plan.”
142
 
Even in Braden, however, where the complaint attacked the plan’s 
mutual funds on multiple substantive grounds (alleging that they charged 
unnecessarily high fees, underperformed available alternatives, offered 
expensive retail shares instead of cheaper institutional shares, and charged 
marketing fees that did not benefit participants),
143
 the Eighth Circuit’s 
reversal of the district court’s motion to dismiss was based on the 
disclosure issue.
144
  More generally, the court seemed to maintain that a 
fiduciary breach must be procedural in nature.
145
  At best, it seems, the 
courts will require plan sponsors to avoid conflicts of interest (or at least 
disclose them) and do a thorough job of documenting their fund selection 
processes.  This may eliminate one motivation for plan fiduciaries to offer 
high-fee funds in participant-directed plans, but it is unlikely to motivate 
those fiduciaries to seek out lower-cost mutual funds instead. 
In summary, as currently interpreted by the courts, the law at most 
demands that plan fiduciaries select a menu of mutual funds that are not 
uniformly more expensive than industry norms.  ERISA’s explicit 
endorsement of participant-directed accounts seemingly makes it 
impossible to require employers to take more of an interest in their 
employees’ retirement savings options.  Given this situation, one logical 
proposal has been to amend ERISA to eliminate participant direction 
altogether,
146
 or repeal section 404(c),
147
 but this is, for political reasons, 
highly unlikely.  Furthermore, this proposal would leave employees reliant 
on the managers of their pension funds, and there is little reason to believe 
that these managers are any more likely to beat the market than active 
mutual funds.  Other proposals have included improved disclosures, better 
default options, and more and better financial education and advice for plan 
participants.
148
  But while information, education, and advice might help 
 
 142.  Id. at 600. 
 143.  Id. at 599.  The marketing (12b-1) fees are used to compensate brokers and other 
intermediaries who sell a mutual fund. 
 144.  Id. (“A reasonable trier of fact could find that failure to disclose this information 
would mislead a reasonable participant in the process of making investment decisions under 
the Plan.”). 
 145.  Id. at 596 (“If these allegations are substantiated, the process by which appellees 
selected and managed the funds in the Plan would have been tainted by failure of effort, 
competence, or loyalty.”). 
 146.  Susan J. Stabile, Paternalism Isn’t Always a Dirty Word: Can the Law Better 
Protect Defined Contribution Plan Participants?, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP’T POL’Y J. 491, 513–
14 (2001). 
 147.  Stabile, supra note 60, at 397. 
 148.  E.g., Befort, supra note 15 at 976–78; Medill, supra note 126, at 75–77 (offering 
proposals to increase the education and advice offered to plan participants); James J. Choi et 
al., Are Empowerment and Education Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, 36 
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solve some of the other problems with 401(k) and similar plans not 
addressed in this Article, these changes would do little on their own to 
improve the set of investment alternatives available to participants. 
III. MAKING ERISA WORK 
This Part argues for a different solution.  Read in light of trust 
investment law and the context of ERISA, section 404(c) should not excuse 
plan sponsors and administrators from the duty to look out for participant 
interests when selecting investment options.  Properly interpreted, that duty 
should imply a presumption against active managed mutual funds and in 
favor of low-cost index funds.  The current Department of Labor 
regulations implementing section 404(c) are misleadingly broad, and the 
safe harbor they define should be restricted to plans that only offer low-cost 
index funds, at least for the segments of the market where indexing is 
available and inexpensive. 
Before getting to the 404(c) safe harbor, it is first necessary to discuss 
modern trust investment law and how, through ERISA, it applies to pension 
plans. 
A. Trust Investment Law in a Nutshell 
In 1976, John Langbein and Richard Posner helped introduce index 
investing to the legal community in an article arguing that trustees could 
invest in index funds without violating the trust investment law of the 
time.
149
  More importantly, they also argued that trustees should invest in 
index funds.  After summarizing modern portfolio theory, they stated, 
“[t]he next question is how much picking and choosing the trustee should 
do within the class of publicly traded securities. . . .  [O]ur real answer is 
‘none.’”
150
  They then summarized the empirical evidence against active 
fund management before concluding: 
[T]he trustee’s rational strategy . . . is to buy shares in a mutual 
fund or other investment vehicle that holds the market 
portfolio—a market fund—and then combine those shares either 
with borrowing, if he wants more “play” than the market 
portfolio, or with some relatively riskless asset such as Treasury 
 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 151, 193 (2005) (recommending that default options 
be changed to reduce participants’ holdings of employer stock). 
 149.  John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (1976). 
 150.  Id. at 14. 
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notes if he wants less.
151
 
Investing in index funds, they continued, was not just the 
economically rational thing to do; it was also consistent with the various 
precepts of trust investment law.
152
  While they did not say that trustees had 
a duty to invest solely in index funds, they saw that possibility in the future:  
When market funds have become available in sufficient variety 
and their experience bears out their prospects, courts may one 
day conclude that it is imprudent for trustees to fail to use such 
vehicles.  Their advantages seem decisive:  at any given 
risk/return level, diversification is maximized and investment 
costs minimized.  A trustee who declines to procure such 
advantages for the beneficiaries of his trust may in the future find 
his conduct difficult to justify.
153
 
In the past thirty-five years, the empirical evidence has largely borne 
out the advantages of index funds, yet the courts have not recognized the 
duty to invest in them that Langbein and Posner foresaw.  One contributing 
factor is perhaps that even the U.S. stock markets have turned out to be not 
quite as efficient as the proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis 
believed in the 1970s.  But the studies reviewed above indicate that they 
are certainly efficient enough to make choosing among actively managed 
stock funds a losing proposition for most people. 
Even though the courts have not adopted a duty to invest in index 
funds, the basic principles of modern trust investment law do dictate a 
strong presumption in their favor.  This is apparent on a close reading of 
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.  The full Restatement (Third) was 
published in 2003, but sections 227 through 229, governing trust 
investment, were released in 1992 as sections 90 through 92 of the 
Restatement, Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule). 
The “prudent investor” standard, as defined by the Restatement, 
“requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution,”
154
 which 
implies that “[t]he trustee must give reasonably careful consideration to 
both the formulation and the implementation of an appropriate investment 
strategy . . . .”
155
  Since many generally reasonable people invest in active 
funds, such investments might seem presumptively reasonable under the 
 
 151.  Id. at 18.  In practice, this means that the only risky investment an investor should 
hold is an index fund tracking the market as a whole; she can obtain more risk and return by 
leveraging this investment with borrowing or less risk and return by putting some of her 
money in Treasury bills. 
 152.  Id. at 18–30. 
 153.  Id. at 30. 
 154.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a) (2007). 
 155.  Id. § 90 cmt. d. 
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prudent investor standard.  The Restatement does not necessarily authorize 
any investment behavior simply because many other people do it; instead, 
it recognizes that expert knowledge and skill may be required to meet the 
prudent investment standard.
156
  But this is still not enough to derive a duty 
to avoid actively managed funds, since many people who might qualify as 
experts—including the managers of most mutual funds—engage in active 
management.
157
 
In addition to the general requirement of care and skill, the prudent 
investor rule imposes several additional duties on trustees, including the 
duties to avoid unreasonable costs, to diversify the investments of the trust, 
and to avoid imprudent delegation of investment responsibilities.
158
  While 
trust law had always required trustees to minimize costs,
159
 the Restatement 
(Third) situates this duty in the context of modern finance.  Section 
90(c)(3) requires trustees to “incur only costs that are reasonable in amount 
and appropriate to the investment responsibilities of the trusteeship.”
160
  
The Introductory Note to the chapter on trust investment gives additional 
meaning to this requirement: 
[T]he duty to avoid unwarranted costs is given increased 
emphasis in the prudent investor rule.  This is done to reflect the 
importance of market-efficiency concepts and differences in the 
degrees of efficiency and inefficiency in various markets. . . .  
The duty to be cost conscious requires attention to such matters 
as the cumulation of fiduciary commissions with agent fees or the 
purchase and management charges associated with mutual funds 
and other pooled-investment vehicles.  In addition, active 
management strategies involve investigation expenses and other 
transaction costs (including capital-gains taxation) that must be 
considered, realistically, in relation to the likelihood of increased 
return from such strategies.
161
 
The more efficient a market is, the less reason to expend effort (and 
 
 156.  Id. (“The duty to exercise both care and skill in investment management may 
require knowledge and experience greater than that of an individual of ordinary intelligence, 
depending on the investment strategy to be employed.”). 
 157.  Note that not all active asset management is created equal.  In illiquid asset classes 
without widely available information, active management makes more sense.  Having very 
large amounts of money can also make active management more attractive, as for Warren 
Buffett.  However, the fact that some very smart and very successful investors invest 
actively in some asset classes does not imply that active management is a viable strategy for 
other investors in highly liquid asset classes such as U.S. stocks. 
 158.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007). 
 159.  Langbein, supra note 122, at 653. 
 160.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007). 
 161.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 17, intro. note (2007). 
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costs) in making active investment decisions.  Trustees are counseled 
specifically to consider the expenses deducted by mutual funds and are 
warned away from engaging in active management strategies unless those 
strategies can be justified by increased expected returns.  The last point 
applies equally well to stock picking by trustees and to investing in actively 
managed funds, which pass their “investigation expenses and other 
transaction costs” through to fund investors.
162
  On its own, this discussion 
of reasonable costs in the context of active investment strategies might 
create something of a presumption against actively managed mutual funds 
for market segments where cheaper index funds are available. 
But there is more.  The explicit duty of diversification, which the 
Restatement made part of the definition of prudent investing, is not simply 
based on the desire to avoid large losses, but derived from modern portfolio 
theory.
163
  Investment risk can be separated into two categories:  market 
risk (the variance of the returns of the market as a whole) and specific risk 
(the variance of the returns of an individual security that is not due to 
market risk).  Investors can gain higher expected returns by taking on more 
market risk; specific risk, however, can be diversified away, and therefore 
does not provide higher returns.
164
  This means that investors should only 
take on market risk.
165
  The Restatement advised trustees to seek “the 
lowest level of risk and cost for a particular level of expected return,”
166
 
which implies eliminating specific risk through diversification.
167
  The 
Restatement further states that “[t]he ultimate goal of diversification would 
be to achieve a portfolio with only the rewarded or ‘market’ element of 
 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. § 90, reporter’s general note on comments e–h; Langbein, supra note 122, at 
647–49. 
 164.  To illustrate this, assume that the market is composed of only two companies that 
are identical in all respects and have the same stock price today but whose stock prices are 
completely uncorrelated.  Investing in only one of those companies is more risky than 
investing in both of them, but does not provide higher expected returns, since the expected 
returns of the two stocks are identical.  This shows that taking on more specific risk is not 
compensated for by higher expected returns. 
 165.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. g (2007) (“[T]he expected return is not 
affected by the portfolio’s reduced level of what is often called ‘specific’ or ‘unique’ risk—
insofar as those terms are used to refer to risks that can be reduced by diversification.  Other 
types of risk, however, are generally compensated through market pricing, so that the 
expected return from an investment or portfolio is directly affected by the level of these 
risks that cannot be diversified away—the so-called ‘market’ or ‘systematic’ risks.”); see 
also id. § 90 cmt. e(1) (“[T]he requirement of caution ordinarily imposes a duty to use 
reasonable care and skill in an effort to minimize or at least reduce diversifiable risks.”). 
 166.  Id. § 90 cmt. f. 
 167.  Id. § 90 cmt. g (“[A] trustee’s duty of prudent investing normally calls for 
reasonable efforts to reduce diversifiable risks, while no such generalization can be made 
with respect to market risk.”). 
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risk.”
168
  This degree of diversification can most easily by achieved by 
investing in index funds.  It is possible to obtain virtually all of the benefits 
of diversification by buying about thirty stocks, but this depends on the 
degree of correlation between the returns of those stocks
169
 
The discussions of passive and active investing in the comments to 
section 90 make a stronger case for index funds.  The comments 
recommend index funds as a vehicle for investing in stocks.
170
  More 
revealing, however, is the discussion of active strategies.  While the 
relevant comment begins, “[p]rudent investment principles also allow the 
use of more active management strategies by trustees,”
171
 the examples it 
provides are real estate and venture capital—relatively illiquid, inefficient 
markets where indexing is not available.
172
  In general, the comment warns, 
“[i]f the extra costs and risks of an investment program are substantial, 
these added costs and risks must be justified by realistically evaluated 
return expectations.”
173
  In particular, it must be true that the “gains from 
the course of action in question can reasonably be expected to compensate 
for its additional costs and risks” and that “there is a credible basis for 
concluding that the trustee—or the manager of a particular activity—
possesses or has access to the competence necessary to carry out the 
program.”
174
  Furthermore, although the Restatement recognized that 
trustees could sometimes delegate their investment responsibilities, the 
duty to avoid imprudent delegation—to “act with prudence in deciding 
whether and how to delegate authority”—means that a trustee must 
 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  According to the mutual fund separation theorem, under certain assumptions, all 
investors should hold risky assets in the same proportions; investors who want more risk and 
higher returns should hold less of the risk-free asset, while those who want less risk and 
lower returns should hold more of the risk-free asset.  In other words, investors should all 
buy differing amounts of only two assets:  (a) an index fund reflecting the entire market and 
(b) cash or Treasury bills.  See generally Niko Canner et al., An Asset Allocation Puzzle, 87 
AM. ECON. REV. 181, 182 (1997).  The assumptions behind the theorem are not fully 
satisfied in practice, but the basic principle that there is no reason to take on specific risk 
holds in most circumstances. 
 170.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(1) (2007) (“Investing in index funds 
that track major stock exchanges or widely published listings of publicly traded stocks is 
illustrative of an essentially passive but practical investment alternative to be considered by 
trustees seeking to include corporate equity in their portfolios.  It is one that offers the 
pricing security and economies of buying in essentially efficient markets.”).  The comment 
later allows for the “direct purchase of appropriate stocks,” but only for purposes of 
“broadening . . . the portfolio’s diversification.”  Now that index funds are available for the 
entire U.S. stock market, this rationale no longer applies. 
 171.  Id. § 90 cmt. h(2). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
KWAK - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  1:09 PM 
2013] IMPROVING RETIREMENT SAVINGS 517 
 
seriously consider whether a fund manager has the ability to deliver 
superior returns before investing the trust’s money in her mutual fund, 
which poses another barrier to investing in active funds.
175
 
These hurdles are difficult to clear for a trustee who chooses to invest 
in domestic stocks through actively managed mutual funds rather than low-
cost index funds.  Both theory and empirical evidence argue strongly that 
there are no “gains from the course of action in question,” let alone gains 
sufficient to compensate for the higher costs of active funds.
176
  Nor is it 
likely that there could be a “credible basis” for concluding that a given fund 
manager has the ability to beat the market on a risk-adjusted basis.
177
  
These facts are acknowledged in the Reporter’s comments, noting that 
“fiduciaries and other investors are confronted with potent evidence that 
the application of expertise, investigation, and diligence in efforts to ‘beat 
the market’ in these publicly traded securities ordinarily promises little or 
no payoff, in fact, often a negative payoff after taking account of research 
and transaction costs.”
178
 
The Restatement, then, argues strongly against incurring the additional 
costs of active management, at least in liquid markets such as U.S. stocks.  
Unlike Gartenberg, which presumptively allows mutual fund fees that are 
relatively close to those elsewhere in the industry, the Restatement does not 
license any investment strategy simply because other reasonable people are 
using it.  Instead, both the duty to avoid unreasonable costs and the duty to 
diversify require trustees to specifically consider whether the additional 
costs and reduced diversification of active management are justified.  And, 
in the abstract, the comments to the Restatement argue that they are not.  
This is almost as strong a position against actively managed stock funds as 
the Restatement could have taken, given its attempt to be flexible to the 
different circumstances of different trusts.
179
  It is certainly possible to 
conceive of situations where a trustee might reasonably want to make 
active investments in domestic equities; for example, a trust with a 
significant, illiquid position in a private energy business might want to take 
a short position in public energy companies and a long position in the rest 
of the stock market.  But the Restatement does imply that a trustee 
 
 175.  Id. § 90(c)(2). 
 176.  Id. § 90 cmt. (h)(2). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. § 90, reporter’s general note on comments e–h. 
 179.  See, e.g., id. ch. 17, intro. note (“[T]he objectives of the ‘prudent investor rule’ of 
this Restatement Third range from that of liberating expert trustees to pursue challenging, 
rewarding, nontraditional strategies when appropriate to the particular trust, to that of 
providing other trustees with reasonably clear guidance to safe harbors that are practical, 
adaptable, readily identifiable, and expectedly rewarding.”). 
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investing a liquid portfolio for a beneficiary with no particular special 
circumstances might face the burden of explaining to a court why she 
invested the trust’s assets in actively managed domestic stock funds rather 
than index funds. 
B. Trust Investment Law and ERISA 
Trust law is relevant to ERISA because that statute expressly 
incorporated the law of trusts.
180
  By requiring that the assets of any 
pension plan be held in trust—a requirement that has been imposed by the 
Internal Revenue Code since 1921
181
—the statute automatically invoked 
trust law.
182
  ERISA’s sections dealing with fiduciary duties were intended 
to “make[] applicable . . . the law of trusts,”
183
 and the duties imposed by 
section 404(a) are also closely modeled on the common law of trusts.
184
  In 
Langbein’s words, “ERISA codifies the central principles of trust fiduciary 
law, and ERISA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress meant to 
track the common law of trusts.  Thus, agencies and courts interpreting and 
applying ERISA have inclined to rely upon the Restatement of Trusts and 
upon the major trust-law treatises.”
185
  Important Supreme Court opinions 
interpreting ERISA have recognized the central importance of trust law in 
understanding the statute.
186
 
However, “trust law does not tell the entire story,” as the Supreme 
Court has held: 
ERISA’s standards and procedural protections partly reflect a 
congressional determination that the common law of trusts did 
not offer completely satisfactory protection.  And, even with 
respect to the trust-like fiduciary standards ERISA imposes, 
 
 180.  See Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, But Is It Right?  The Common Law of Trusts 
in ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391, 395–97 (2001) (citing legislative intent to 
have ERISA track traditional trust law’s fiduciary conduct rules); John H. Langbein, The 
Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 168–
70 (1997) (describing the conscious parallel between ERISA and conventional trust law). 
 181.  29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006). 
 182.  Langbein, supra note 180, at 169. 
 183.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973) (Conf. Rep.). 
 184.  Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988). 
 185.  Langbein, supra note 180, at 169. 
 186.  See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) 
(“ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.  ERISA’s legislative 
history confirms that the Act’s fiduciary responsibility provisions ‘codif[y] and mak[e] 
applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of 
trusts.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, pt. 11 
(1973))). 
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Congress “expect[ed] that the courts will interpret this prudent 
man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the 
special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,” as they 
“develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under 
ERISA-regulated plans.
187
 
In addition to trust law, courts must also consider the purposes of the 
statute, in particular, “Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced 
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire 
not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or 
litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare 
benefit plans in the first place.”
188
  The “federal common law” referred to 
by the Supreme Court should build on the traditional common law but take 
into consideration the particular characteristics of employer-sponsored 
plans and the specific objectives of ERISA. 
In fact, Congress in 1974 expanded upon existing trust investment law 
in order to keep abreast of contemporary investing theory and practice.  In 
making the duty of diversification part of the prudent man standard, ERISA 
anticipated the treatment of diversification in the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts.
189
  ERISA also explicitly abrogated the traditional non-delegation 
rule of trust investing, which had limited the ability of trustees to hire 
external asset managers (such as mutual fund managers).
190
  In expressly 
authorizing pension plans to use external management, ERISA again 
anticipated the Restatement, which allows trustees to delegate 
responsibilities where it is prudent to do so.
191
 
The principles of trust investment law expressed in the Restatement, 
then, are relevant to the interpretation of ERISA for at least three reasons.  
First, since ERISA expressly incorporates key concepts of the common law 
of trusts, the meaning of those concepts continues to be governed, at least 
as a starting point, by the common law of trusts.  This is the position of the 
Restatement itself:  “The principles of this Restatement are generally 
 
 187.  Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Firestone, 499 U.S. at 110). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See Langbein, supra note 122, at 646 (noting that “the trustee’s duty to diversify 
has become more acute—for example, in ERISA, the 1974 federal pension legislation, a 
fiduciary must diversify the investments of participants and beneficiaries to minimize risk of 
loss unless doing so is clearly imprudent.”). 
 190.  29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3) (2006); see Langbein, supra note 122, at 652 (noting a 
similar abrogation in the 1992 Restatement). 
 191.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80(1) (2007); see also id. § 90 cmt. j (“In 
administering the trust’s investment activities, the trustee has power, and may sometimes 
have a duty, to delegate such functions and in such manner as a prudent investor would 
delegate under the circumstances.”). 
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appropriate to those statutory bodies of rules, both by analogy and insofar 
as those rules expressly or impliedly incorporate general principles of trust 
law.”
192
 
Second, insofar as trust investment law has changed since 1974, 
ERISA actually anticipated its future direction.  Both ERISA’s emphasis on 
diversification and its greater tolerance for delegation are consistent with 
the subsequent reformulation of trust investment law in keeping with 
modern financial theory and with the increasing specialization of the asset 
management industry.
193
  By  1976, only two years after ERISA’s passage, 
Langbein and Posner were able to argue that trustees should invest in index 
funds and might one day have a duty to do so.  This indicates that applying 
the core principles of the Restatement to ERISA is not an anachronism that 
does violence to contemporary legislative intent. 
Third, the implications of contemporary trust investment law promote 
one of the central purposes of ERISA, “offer[ing] employees enhanced 
protection for their benefits,” while not affecting the other—encouraging 
employers to offer employee benefits plans in the first place.
194
  The 
Restatement encourages trustees to identify the risk-return combination 
appropriate for a given trust and then to achieve that combination by 
investing in index funds, at least for asset classes where that is practical.  
The emphasis on minimizing risk and cost for a given level of expected 
returns is particularly suited for pension plans, which are intended to 
provide income security for employees after they retire.  While an 
individual trust might have a valid reason to undertake an unorthodox 
investment strategy, this is unlikely to be true for an employer-sponsored 
pension plan.  In addition, from a public policy standpoint, nothing is 
gained if some company pension plans beat the market spectacularly and 
others trail the market dismally.  The former companies (or their 
employees) will enjoy a windfall while the latter will suffer losses or, 
worse, go bankrupt and shift their pension obligations to taxpayers (via the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal insurer of private 
pensions).  Even if the gross gains of the one balance the gross losses of the 
other, the additional costs of their active investment strategies will be a net 
drain on the economy as a whole. 
At the same time, there is no reason why holding employer-sponsored 
 
 192.  Id. § 1 cmt. a(1). 
 193.  See id. § 90, reporter’s general note (“[ERISA] and its 1979 regulations also reveal, 
in still another context, a felt need for departures from traditional applications of the 
prudent-man rule of trust law.  This is indicated in part through the U.S. Department of 
Labor regulations’ recognition of modern portfolio theory and of more flexible concepts (for 
example, in delegation and in risk-return relationships).”). 
 194.  Variety Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). 
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pension plans to the requirements of current trust investment law would 
make employers less likely to offer such plans, so long as those 
requirements are clearly spelled out.  From an administrative standpoint, it 
is no more difficult or expensive to invest plan assets in index funds than to 
invest them in actively managed funds.  The important thing from the 
employer’s standpoint is to avoid unnecessary litigation risk—the risk that 
a court will find that its investment strategy constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty.  And litigation risk in this case depends less on the 
substance of the law than on how clear that law is and whether or not 
clearly defined safe harbors are available. 
For these reasons, ERISA’s requirements for the investment of plan 
assets should be informed by current trust investment law as expressed in 
the Restatement (Third).  Trust law, in turn, strongly counsels ERISA plan 
fiduciaries to avoid active investing in liquid, efficient market segments 
where low-cost indexing is available.  They can adopt active investing 
strategies in inefficient markets such as real estate or venture capital.  They 
can also invest actively in liquid markets such as domestic stocks, but only 
if they can demonstrate that doing so complies with the standards of 
prudent investing. 
C. ERISA and Participant-Directed Accounts 
ERISA, however, allows for participant-directed accounts.  The 
question, then, is what implications participant direction has for the duty of 
plan fiduciaries to invest plan assets prudently.  To answer that question, 
we must first figure out the role of participant direction in a statute 
dedicated to protecting employee benefits under employer pension plans. 
ERISA predated the 401(k) revolution, and its drafters most likely did 
not envision a world where people would be individually responsible for 
both funding and investing their retirement accounts.  Individual accounts 
are a characteristic of defined contribution plans, not the defined benefit 
plans that were common in the 1960s and early 1970s.  The defined 
contribution plans that existed at the time were mainly employee stock 
ownership plans and profit-sharing plans.
195
  Since these were never 
intended to be the main source of an employee’s retirement income, they 
presumably did not require as much protection as traditional pension plans. 
More generally, however, participant direction has an important and 
positive role to play in a pension plan governed by trust investment law.  A 
pension plan may be responsible for providing retirement income to 
thousands of participants of different ages, incomes, wealth categories, 
 
 195.  Befort, supra note 15, at 959 n.131. 
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family situations, health statuses, and so on.  Trust law requires trustees to 
avoid specific (uncompensated) risk, but it also recognizes that the 
appropriate degree of market (compensated) risk depends on the particular 
circumstances of the trust.
196
  In other words, there is a spectrum of 
appropriate portfolios, each of which is fully diversified, differing only in 
their degree of market risk.
197
  In a defined contribution plan, centralized 
management of all plan assets would place every participant at the same 
point on this risk-return spectrum, regardless of her individual situation.  
Participant direction solves this problem by allowing each individual to 
select the risk-return profile that best suits her individual situation, in effect 
tailoring the trust’s investment strategy to the needs of each beneficiary. 
Allowing each participant to select her preferred location on the 
spectrum of appropriate portfolios is an improvement over centralized asset 
management and is consistent with the principles of prudent investing 
contained in trust law.  Allowing each participant to construct an 
inappropriate portfolio by selecting from investment options that violate 
those principles, however, cannot possibly be prudent.  When a participant 
can choose from a menu of expensive, actively managed mutual funds 
(which, in Hecker, contained more than two thousand funds), participant 
direction allows her to deviate far from the optimal frontier of investment 
portfolios recommended by trust investment law.  For example, even if a 
401(k) plan offers a few low-cost index funds, if it also includes high-cost, 
actively managed, sector-specific funds, it enables participants to create 
portfolios that contain large amounts of specific risk, violating a 
fundamental principle of the Restatement.
198
  Although these active funds 
may be riskier than index funds, in the sense that there is greater variance 
in the distribution of their expected returns, this higher risk is not justified 
by higher return expectations (because it is specific risk that could be 
diversified away), and so participants could obtain better risk-return 
combinations by investing in index funds. 
While assembling undiversified portfolios made up of expensive 
active funds may not be a wise investment strategy, in the abstract it does 
not violate any particular legal principles.  Doing so in the context of a trust 
 
 196.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (2007) (“Decisions concerning a 
prudent or suitable level of market risk for a particular trust can be reached only after 
thoughtful consideration of its purposes and all of the relevant trust and beneficiary 
circumstances.”). 
 197.  These portfolios are constructed by buying the market portfolio and combining it 
either with risk-free assets (to reduce risk) or with borrowing (to increase risk). 
 198.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h (2007) (“Diversification is a 
common theme of modern investment concepts, and it ordinarily applies at all different 
levels of risk-return preference.”) (citations omitted). 
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and, in particular, a pension plan that is dedicated to providing retirement 
income and governed by a statute that places demanding fiduciary duties on 
plan administrators, does raise issues.  A trustee begins with an obligation 
to diversify the trust’s assets so far as practical in order to maximize 
expected returns for any level of risk, and to do so at a reasonable cost.  If 
the trustee gives participants control over their individual accounts, that 
fundamental obligation does not go away.  Allowing each participant to 
determine and act on her own risk tolerance is consistent with trust 
investment law; allowing her to bet her account on the roulette wheel is 
not, nor are other investment strategies that violate the basic principles of 
diversification and avoiding unreasonable costs. 
In addition, even if there might be good reasons for an individual to 
invest in active funds, giving any plan participant the option of buying 
actively managed funds constitutes an improper delegation of investment 
authority, since the plan sponsor cannot assume that every employee has 
the expertise necessary to choose among those funds.  While modern trust 
law recognizes the need for delegation, that delegation must itself be 
prudent,
199
 and the trustee must take into account “the knowledge, skill, 
facilities, and compensation of both the trustee and the prospective 
agents.”
200
  Given that a participant-directed plan may delegate important 
decisions to thousands of people, it would be dangerous to assume that 
every one of them possesses the capabilities required to invest prudently.  
Even if an individual employee may not perfectly assess her own financial 
situation in deciding how much risk to take on, she can plausibly do a 
better job than the plan trustee could do for her.  But there is no reason to 
believe that the typical employee will be able to pick out the few actively 
managed mutual funds that can be expected to beat the market. 
To be consistent with trust investment law and with ERISA, then, 
participant direction-the delegation of investment decisions to plan 
participants-in employer pension plans should be limited to allowing each 
participant to select the level of risk and expected return appropriate to her 
circumstances.  This could be done by offering a set of low-cost index 
funds covering the major market segments and allowing participants to 
decide how to allocate their accounts across those funds.
201
  Plan fiduciaries 
that give participants the ability to spend more money (in the form of 
 
 199.  Id. § 90 cmt. j (“In deciding what as well as whether to delegate and in selecting, 
instructing, and supervising or monitoring agents, the trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries 
to act as a prudent investor would act under the circumstances.”). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Alternatively, the plan could offer a single, “balanced” index fund-approximating 
the performance of all of the global securities markets aggregated together-alongside an 
option to invest in short-term Treasury bills. 
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higher fund expenses) on less-diversified mutual funds with lower expected 
returns should be prepared to explain themselves in court. 
D. The Current Safe Harbor 
But wait:  What about section 404(c) and the exemption from liability 
for losses caused by a participant’s investment decisions?  The section 
404(c) regulations say that a plan need only provide at least three 
diversified investment alternatives (which do not have to be index funds) 
that together make possible a wide range of risk-return choices; beyond 
that, plans can include any other investments.  If the investment options 
included in a plan together comply with the regulations,
202
 various courts 
have held that any duty to select those options prudently is either satisfied 
or, in the alternative, unenforceable by plan participants.
203
 
But this is not what ERISA actually says.  Section 404(c) authorizes 
the Department of Labor to determine the meaning of the phrase, “if a 
participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his 
account.”
204
  Even if that condition is met, however, the safe harbor only 
applies to losses that “result[] from such participant’s or beneficiary’s 
exercise of control . . . .”
205
  The key question in any case is whether a 
participant’s losses are caused by her exercise of control or by some other 
factor for which plan fiduciaries may remain liable. 
The plain meaning of “exercise of control” extends only to the actual 
investment decisions made by the participant.  Assume, for example, that a 
plan offers a stock index fund and a bond index fund, a participant puts all 
of her money in the stock index fund, and the stock market loses fifty 
 
 202.  On close examination, a plan that only includes actively managed mutual funds 
may not even comply with the regulations.  According to the regulations, a plan must offer 
“at least three investment alternatives” that must “in the aggregate enable the participant or 
beneficiary by choosing among them to achieve a portfolio with aggregate risk and return 
characteristics at any point within the range normally appropriate for the participant or 
beneficiary . . . .”  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(3).  Three different, diversified 
active funds would allow participants to construct portfolios having different aggregate risk 
and return characteristics.  But arguably none of these portfolios are “within the range 
normally appropriate for the participant or beneficiary,” at least not according to modern 
trust investment law, for which a risk-return combination is only appropriate if it minimizes 
risk for that level of expected return.  Even if this is correct, however, the specific 
requirements of paragraph (b)(3)(i)(B) do not apply to all investment alternatives, but only 
to the three or more necessary to comply with that paragraph, and therefore a plan that uses 
index funds to clear that hurdle could also include any number of expensive, actively 
managed funds. 
 203.  See supra Part B. 
 204.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 205.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
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percent of its value (as happened in the panic of 2008–09):  Then, the 
participant’s losses clearly result from her “exercise of control” and the 
plan fiduciaries should not be liable for those losses.
206
  By contrast, 
assume that a plan includes at least three index funds that together satisfy 
the “broad range” requirement, but that these funds charge expense ratios 
of two percentage points, rather than the ten to twenty basis points charged 
by similar funds.  Decades later, a participant could argue that her lower 
account value due to those higher fees constitutes a loss.  If the court agrees 
that it is a loss, then it was clearly caused by the plan fiduciaries’ poor 
selection of investment options and not by her own exercise of control.
207
  
Under the wording of the statute, such a loss should be charged to the plan 
fiduciaries, despite the fact that the plan’s investment options fit within the 
Department’s regulations. 
In other words, fiduciaries are not liable for the consequences of 
participant choices among investment alternatives, but they remain liable 
for losses that result from their selection of those investment alternatives in 
the first place.  This is the position that the Department of Labor took in 
issuing its final regulation:  “[T]he act of designating investment 
alternatives . . . in an ERISA section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to 
which the limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is not 
applicable.”
208
  So in selecting investment options, plan fiduciaries remain 
bound by the duties of loyalty, care, and diversification
209
 and are also 
barred from paying more than “reasonable compensation” for services.
210
 
In most interesting cases, the participant’s losses will be due to both 
investment selection by plan fiduciaries and exercise of control by the 
 
 206.  The participant might argue that her losses resulted from the existence of the stock 
fund as an alternative and that the plan should only have offered the bond fund, but such a 
limited set of options would violate not only the “broad range” requirement, but also the 
basic principles of trust investment law. 
 207. For a similar example, see Angela Hayden Magary, Pitfalls of an ERISA 404(c) 
DefenseEmployers’ Potential Liability for Employee-Directed Retirement Plans, 11.2 
PIABA B.J. 59, 64 (2004). 
 208.  Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans (ERISA 
Section 404(c) Plans), 57 Fed. Reg. 46922 (Oct. 13, 1992); see also Paul J. Donahue, Plan 
Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in Participant-Directed Defined 
Contribution Plans and the Choice between Stable Value and Money Market, 39 AKRON L. 
REV. 9, 15–17 (2006) (citing the preamble to the Final Regulations and the Department’s 
amicus brief in the Enron litigation in which the Department reiterated its view that 
fiduciaries cannot escape their obligation to prudently select investment options). 
 209.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006). 
 210.  29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (2006).  29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) prohibits transactions 
between a plan and a “party in interest,” which is defined by section 1002(14) to include a 
person who provides services to a plan; and section 1108(b)(2) provides an exemption to 
section 1106 for “reasonable arrangements with a party in interest” for necessary services, 
“if no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor.”  Id. § 1108. 
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participant.  In In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, the plaintiffs lost 
money they had invested in guaranteed investment contracts issued by an 
insurance company that later collapsed.
211
  Unisys, the plan sponsor, argued 
that even if the inclusion of that investment alternative was imprudent, plan 
fiduciaries were shielded from liability by section 404(c) because the 
plaintiffs’ losses resulted from their “informed choice” to invest in that 
alternative.
212
  The Third Circuit agreed in principle with Unisys: 
[A] fiduciary may call upon section 1104(c)’s protection where a 
causal nexus between a participant’s or a beneficiary’s exercise 
of control and the claimed loss is demonstrated.  This requisite 
causal connection is, in our view, established with proof that a 
participant’s or a beneficiary’s control was a cause-in-fact, as 
well as a substantial contributing factor in bringing about the loss 
incurred.
213
 
In general, if a plan offers some good investment options and some 
bad ones, even if the inclusion of the bad ones constitutes a fiduciary 
breach, a participant’s decision to invest in one or more of the bad ones will 
easily qualify as both a cause-in-fact of and a substantial contributing factor 
to the loss, and the plan fiduciaries will not face liability.
214
 
Either Unisys is wrong or its implications are absurd.  Assume that a 
plan includes diversified investment options that together satisfy the “broad 
range” requirement but also allows participants to place their money on 
zero on the roulette wheel (and discloses that playing roulette is risky).  If a 
participant does the latter and loses her entire account, her losses result 
from both her own rashness and the plan sponsor’s blatant irresponsibility, 
yet the Unisys standard would absolve the sponsor of liability.  It is 
 
 211.  In re Unisys Savs. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 212.  Id. at 444–45. 
 213.  Id. at 445.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006) is the codified version of ERISA § 404(c).  
However, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Unisys on the 
grounds that Unisys had not proven that it had provided sufficient information to plan 
participants to give them effective control.  Assuming sufficient disclosure, the inclusion of 
the guaranteed investment contracts would not have prevented Unisys from invoking section 
404(c). 
 214.  On Unisys, see Stabile, supra note 60, at 377–78 (explaining that the Unisys 
decision excuses a fiduciary from liability when there is a causal relationship between the 
participant’s exercise of control and the loss).  But see Donahue, supra note 208, at 15–16 
n.34 (calling Stabile’s reading of Unisys “flawed” and arguing that it is possible to hold a 
fiduciary liable when a participant’s losses result from his or her selection).  Donahue 
claims that Unisys “actually supports the assertion that damages from the Plan Sponsor can 
be obtained as a result of option selection decisions,” but the passage he quotes states that 
liability could arise “if the Plans did not offer an acceptable alternative to GIC investments.”  
Id.  By implication, if they did offer an acceptable alternative, the plan fiduciaries would be 
shielded from liability. 
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difficult to imagine that Congress intended to protect plan fiduciaries in 
cases where their own imprudence was a major and avoidable cause of 
participant losses. 
Unisys was based on events that occurred before the current 
regulations were issued.  Several courts have since deferred to the 
Department of Labor’s position that the selection of investment options is 
itself subject to fiduciary duties, including the Fourth Circuit in DiFelice v. 
U.S. Airways, Inc.
215
  Recently, however, two other courts of appeals have 
rejected the Department’s position.  In Hecker, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the safe harbor “does protect a fiduciary that satisfies the criteria of § 
1104(c) and includes a sufficient range of options so that the participants 
have control over the risk of loss.”
216
  The court essentially asserted that 
any plan that complies with the regulations is shielded from claims of 
fiduciary breach.
217
  The opinion quotes from the “broad range” criterion of 
the regulations, then describes how the plan in question met that 
requirement, and concludes:  “If particular participants lost money or did 
not earn as much as they would have liked, that disappointing outcome was 
attributable to their individual choices.”
218
  In short, if a plan provides 
sufficient choice, as defined by the regulations, its fiduciaries are not liable 
if participants invest in the bad funds.  This argument, however, does not 
seriously address the Department of Labor’s position that imprudent fund 
selection remains a fiduciary breach, even if the resulting investment menu 
technically complies with the regulations.  Instead, Hecker asserts that 
complying with the regulations and giving participants “control over the 
risk of loss” is enough to earn a complete exemption from liability.
219
 
In Langbecker v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the Department’s position on different grounds.
220
  The court 
argued that the Department’s position was an unreasonable interpretation of 
section 404(c) because it “would render the § 404(c) defense applicable 
only where plan managers breached no fiduciary duty, and thus only where 
 
 215.  497 F.3d 410, 418 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Kanawi v. Bechtel Corp., 590 F. 
Supp. 2d 1213, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (accepting the Department of Labor’s position that a 
fiduciary has a “continuing duty to monitor the prudence of investment options in a plan 
regardless of the scope of a participant’s control”); Bendaoud v. Hodgson, 578 F. Supp. 2d 
257, 271 (D. Mass. 2008) (asserting that fiduciaries can be liable for providing unwise 
investment choices even if plan participants direct their own investments). 
 216.  556 F.3d 575, 589 (7th Cir. 2009).  29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) is the codified version of 
ERISA § 404(c). 
 217.  Id. at 589–90. 
 218.  Id. at 590. 
 219.  Id. at 589. 
 220.  476 F.3d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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it is unnecessary.”
221
  In other words, if a plan can comply with the “broad 
range” requirement, yet its fiduciaries can still be liable for imprudent 
selection of investment options, then that component of the regulations 
might as well not exist.  Put another way, if a plan fiduciary can 
demonstrate prudence in its choice of investment options, then it has 
already met its fiduciary duties, and whether it complies with the 
regulations is irrelevant. 
The court in Langbecker has a valid point, but it is ultimately too cute.  
The point is that the current regulations are not very helpful.  They show 
employers how to fulfill the statutory requirement that participants be 
permitted to exercise control over their accounts, which shields them from 
liability for losses resulting from participant investment decisions.  But 
compliance with the regulations does not provide an automatic exemption 
from liability for imprudent selection of investment options.  From an 
employer’s perspective, this safe harbor is deeply flawed, since complying 
with the details of the regulations still does not provide watertight 
protection from lawsuits. 
Even if the safe harbor is flawed, however, that does not authorize 
courts to change the meaning of the statute.  The statute still exempts plan 
fiduciaries only for losses resulting from the participant’s “exercise of 
control,” which plainly does not encompass the prior selection of 
investment alternatives.  If plan sponsors and administrators are excused 
from their fiduciary duties whenever a participant’s investment choices 
played some role in causing her losses, as in Unisys, the simple, 
predictable, and all-too-frequent fact of poor individual decision-making 
would absolve fiduciaries of even the most blatantly irresponsible and 
indefensible decisions.  This seems incompatible with the basic principles 
of trust law, which require trustees to be loyal to the interests of their 
beneficiaries, and with ERISA’s fiduciary duty structure, which demands 
care, skill, and prudence from plan sponsors and administrators.  Such a 
powerful get-out-of-jail-free card would also undermine a statute designed 
to protect employee retirement savings from unscrupulous or incompetent 
employers. 
For these reasons, simply complying with the letter of the Department 
of Labor’s regulations—for example, by offering three dissimilar, 
diversified mutual funds—is not enough to escape trust investment law’s 
presumption in favor of indexing and against active management.  A plan 
may comply with the “broad range” requirement of the regulations, but if it 
enables participants to create suboptimal portfolios that a trustee would not 
be allowed to invest in, it violates the duties of diversification, avoiding 
 
 221.  Id. 
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unreasonable costs, and prudent delegation.  This does not automatically 
mean that any plan that includes active funds represents a breach of 
fiduciary duty.  It only means that, to defend against a claim of breach, the 
plan sponsor and administrator have to explain why the inclusion of those 
funds was consistent with their fiduciary duties.  Given the empirical 
evidence against active fund management, however, this may be a difficult 
case to make. 
E. A Better Safe Harbor 
My previous argument that employers remain liable for imprudent 
fund selection, despite section 404(c) and its enabling regulations, has two 
practical shortcomings.  First, while it is quite plausible that some courts 
will agree with the Department of Labor that the section 404(c) exemption 
does not apply to the selection of investment alternatives, it is unlikely that 
they will suddenly rule that actively managed mutual funds are imprudent 
and that including such funds in a pension plan constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty; such a ruling would immediately expose the fiduciaries of 
thousands of 401(k) plans to potential liability for the losses suffered by 
their participants.  Second, it leaves employers in limbo, unable to rely on 
the existing regulations and unsure how to protect themselves from liability 
for imprudent fund selection. 
For these reasons, a better and more realistic solution is for the 
Department of Labor to modify the section 404(c) regulations, as it is 
authorized to do by the statute.
222
  To be useful, a safe harbor should define, 
as clearly as possible, those objective conditions that, if met, will shield a 
party from liability.  In this case, it should be narrower (covering fewer 
plans), but safer (minimizing the chances that those plans might create 
liability). 
The current section 404(c) regulations are too broad because they 
encompass pension plans that contravene the principles of trust investing 
and therefore violate ERISA’s fiduciary duties.  Instead, to provide a 
meaningful safe harbor, the regulations should only permit plans with 
investment menus that are consistent with trust law and ERISA, interpreted 
conservatively (from the fiduciary’s point of view)–that is, the definition of 
a “broad range of investment alternatives” should exclude plans that 
plausibly constitute a violation of fiduciary duties.  Then employers could 
be confident that they were not only complying with the Department of 
 
 222.  The section 404(c) exemption from liability applies “if a participant or beneficiary 
exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of the 
Secretary).”  29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
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Labor’s definition of “exercise of control” but also satisfying the 
underlying fiduciary duty to select investment alternatives prudently. 
As argued above, the only investment strategy that unequivocally 
complies with trust investment law is to diversify away specific risk as 
much as possible at the lowest cost possible.  This means that for assets 
traded in liquid, efficient markets, trustees should invest solely through 
low-cost index funds, where those funds are available.  Although pension 
plan participants should be allowed to make asset allocation decisions that 
reflect their risk preferences, within each asset class they should invest in 
low-cost index funds wherever possible.  Therefore, the “broad range” 
component of the section 404(c) regulations should be limited to plans that 
only include low-cost index funds,
223
 each covering a major segment of the 
securities markets—such as U.S. stocks, international (non-U.S. stocks), 
U.S. bonds, Treasury bonds, or Treasury inflation-indexed bonds—as well 
as a money market fund or similar low-risk investment option.  A plan 
could not include additional investment options beyond those specified by 
the regulations, and therefore could not include less diversified, more 
expensive, actively managed funds.
224
 
This proposal may seem like a return to the restrictive “legal lists” of 
investments that trustees were allowed to invest in, which were used in 
some jurisdictions into the early twentieth century.
225
  But the proposal 
concerns a safe harbor, not an exclusive list.  Just as the Restatement says 
that active management may be suitable under certain circumstances, it 
may be prudent for a plan to include active funds, especially in asset 
classes where low-cost index funds are not available.  But trust law 
establishes a presumption against such investments:  Recall that their 
“added costs and risks must be justified by realistically evaluated return 
expectations.”
226
  Therefore, actively managed funds should not receive the 
automatic protection of the regulatory safe harbor. 
Such a narrowly drawn safe harbor will motivate most employers to 
conform their plans to its requirements.  This will have two salutary policy 
 
 223.  Index funds that attempt to follow the same indexes have varying expenses and 
varying levels of tracking error—the difference between the fund’s gross returns and the 
actual returns of the index itself.  Exchange-traded funds that track particular indexes may 
also have advantages over traditional index mutual funds.  Determining exactly what 
investment options qualify as “low-cost index funds” for the purposes of the regulations is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 224.  Ideally, the regulatory safe harbor would exclude plans that include company stock 
as an investment option.  An argument might be made, however, that ERISA’s exemption of 
company stock from its general diversification requirement implies that such plans are 
eligible for safe harbor.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2006). 
 225.  Langbein, supra note 122, at 643–44. 
 226.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2) (2007). 
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effects.  First, it will improve plan participants’ investment outcomes by 
reducing the amount of their assets that is drained away by fund 
management fees (saving them on the order of fifteen billion dollars each 
year)
227
 and by steering them away from less diversified investment options 
that are likely to underperform the market, even before taking fees into 
account.  With a restricted set of investment options, participants are more 
likely to invest on the efficient risk-return spectrum and more likely to 
consider where they should be on that spectrum. 
Second, this reshaping of pension plans could have spillover effects on 
the mutual fund market as a whole.  Defined contribution plans are a major 
source of demand for mutual funds, with $2.5 trillion out of the total $11.8 
trillion invested in U.S. mutual funds, and shifting that money into low-cost 
index funds will itself significantly lower the industry’s weighted average 
expense ratio.  In addition, many people’s introduction to investing is 
through 401(k) plans:  Of households that first purchased mutual funds 
between 2005 and 2010, seventy-two percent were introduced to mutual 
funds by their employer-sponsored retirement plans.
228
  Since the simplest 
way to continue investing one’s plan balance after leaving a company is to 
convert it into an IRA with the same fund company, investing patterns set 
in a defined contribution plan persist, at least to some extent, into 
individual investing.  Therefore, a policy change that shifts assets in 
employer pension plans from active funds to index funds is likely to cause 
a similar shift in IRAs, potentially doing far more than section 36(b) of the 
1940 Act to solve the problem of high fund fees. 
While narrowing the section 404(c) safe harbor offers employees 
 
 227.  The weighted average expense ratio for stock mutual funds in 401(k) plans was 74 
basis points in 2009.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 110.  A reduction in the average 
expense ratio by 60 basis points on $2.5 trillion in assets would reduce aggregate fees by 
$15 billion.  This estimate excludes the higher transaction costs of active funds, which are 
not reflected in their expense ratios.  It is theoretically possible that a major shift from active 
funds in index funds could cause those index funds to become more expensive.  This 
assumes that low-cost index funds currently serve as loss leaders that are cross-subsidized 
by high-cost active funds, which is a possible equilibrium in a market with sophisticated and 
unsophisticated consumers.  See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, 
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 
505 (2006) (demonstrating that informational shrouding is present even in highly 
competitive markets).  Even in this case, there should still be a large reduction in aggregate 
fees because index funds have lower costs than active funds.  It is also not clear that the 
cheapest index funds are being sold as loss leaders.  The Vanguard 500 Index Fund, for 
example, has an expense ratio as low as 6 basis points, but it also has more than $100 billion 
under management, providing more than $60 million in annual revenues to cover its costs.  
Vanguard Fund Profile: Vanguard 500 Index Fund Admiral Shares, VANGUARD GROUP, 
INC., https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0540&FundIntExt=INT 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 228.  INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 85. 
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enhanced protection for their benefits, it does not discourage employers 
from offering pension plans.  The two major reasons why an employer 
would not offer a pension plan are administrative cost and litigation risk.  A 
plan including a handful of index funds is no more expensive to administer 
than a plan including a large menu of actively managed funds.  More likely, 
every large fund family would create an off-the-shelf plan that meets the 
requirements of the safe harbor, and since the plans would be substantively 
similar, they would be likely to compete on price.  More importantly, this 
narrower safe harbor should reduce litigation risk for employers and plan 
fiduciaries.  Because the safe harbor is defined to encompass only plans 
that are consistent with the principles of trust investment law and ERISA, 
the fact that a plan fits within the safe harbor should imply that its 
investment alternatives were selected prudently.  This could only reduce 
liability risk from the current state of affairs where a plan fiduciary must 
first ensure that the plan’s investment options comply with the many details 
of the “broad range” requirement, and then might still be liable for 
participant losses. 
There is a more modest alternative that could still have a significant 
impact on plan participants’ investments and hence the security of their 
retirement savings.  Instead of restricting the safe harbor to plans that only 
offer low-cost index funds, the regulations could grant protection to plans 
that make low-cost indexing the default allocation of participant 
investments; that is, money contributed to employees’ accounts would be 
invested in one or more index funds unless the employee affirmatively 
opted for a different investment strategy.  The general idea of using default 
options to increase retirement savings has received considerable attention 
recently.  This type of approach has proven attractive to many legal 
scholars because it preserves individuals’ freedom of choice while 
encouraging them to make choices that are in their own interests.
229
  The 
best-known example is automatically enrolling new employees in 401(k) 
plans unless they opt out, which results in much higher participation rates 
than if employees are not enrolled by default.
230
  Default options also have 
 
 229.  In many cases, the people making these choices recognize that they are acting in 
their own interests.  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (demonstrating how to 
structure social policies to encourage individuals to make what they themselves consider the 
best decisions). 
 230.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 229, at 103–17 (summarizing retirement 
savings behavior and default options); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default 
Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167 (Jeffrey Brown et al. eds., 2009) 
(examining empirical evidence to conclude that defaults strongly impact savings outcomes); 
James J. Choi et al., For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, 
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a significant effect on the amount of money that plan participants put 
aside
231
 and on how participants allocate their money among various 
investment options.
232
  
The Department of Labor could modify its regulations to require a 
default allocation to one or more low-cost index funds for any plan seeking 
to benefit from the section 404(c) safe harbor.  Under these rules, 
employees could still affirmatively choose to move their money to other 
investment options.  Since defaults seem to be at least somewhat “sticky,” 
this would probably increase the amount of retirement plan money invested 
in low-cost index funds.  There are at least two reasons why it is far from a 
perfect solution, however.  First, default asset allocations seem to be less 
sticky than default participation.  At one company where employees were 
automatically enrolled in a 401(k) plan with a default allocation, fewer than 
half of them had all of their money in the default fund after fifteen to 
twenty-four months.
233
  In this case, the default allocation was to a money 
market fund (with very low returns), which could explain why so many 
people shifted away from it.  More generally, however, most people agree 
in principle that they should be saving for retirement, so relatively few opt 
out of a plan with automatic enrollment; there is less popular consensus 
about particular investment strategies, so we would expect more people to 
opt out of the default allocation.  Second, once employees have enrolled in 
a 401(k) plan, it is not in anyone’s interests for them to opt out.  By 
contrast, if employees are being defaulted into low-cost index funds, it is in 
the interests of the companies that offer the other available funds—or even 
of the plan administrator itself, which is often a mutual fund company—to 
convince them to switch into higher-cost funds.  We can expect those fund 
companies to actively market their higher-cost funds to participants, 
reducing the stickiness of the default option and eroding the share of 
investments allocated to index funds. 
Whether the safe harbor excludes plans that offer active funds or is 
simply restricted to funds that make index funds the default investment 
option, employees would benefit from lower investment costs and higher 
 
in PERSPECTIVES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81 (David Wise ed., 2004) (finding that 
automatic enrollment increases 401(k) participation and that a majority of new plan 
participants save at the default contribution rate); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, 
The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. 
ECON. 1149 (2001) (finding that 401(k) participation is higher with automatic enrollment 
and that a substantial share of those who enroll under automatic enrollment retain the default 
fund allocation and contribution rate). 
 231.  Beshears et al., supra note 230, at 173–75. 
 232.  Beshears et al., supra note 230, at 175–76. 
 233.  Beshears et al., supra note 230, at 175 (examining employees who were hired after 
automatic enrollment began). 
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expected net returns, while employers would benefit from lower litigation 
risk.  The big loser, of course, would be the asset management industry.  
Fund companies would no longer be able to pocket one percent of their 
customers’ assets every year for providing products that, on average and in 
the aggregate, underperform the market.  But that is precisely the point. 
IV. POLICY GOALS AND DOCTRINAL CONSTRAINTS 
This Article makes a legal argument to achieve a public policy goal.  
As such, it faces at least two serious issues.  First, even if the policy goal is 
desirable, is it absolutely required by current law, or are there other 
interpretations of trust investment law and ERISA that dictate a different 
outcome?  And second, what should we do about parts of the overall 
retirement savings landscape where the same policy goal applies but the 
legal argument is not available, such as IRAs? 
A. Trust Law, the Restatement, and Department of Labor Regulations 
The central doctrinal argument of this Article—that contemporary 
trust investment law contains a presumption against active investment 
management, at least for asset categories where low-cost indexing is 
feasible—rests heavily on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, especially its 
comments.  A Restatement, however, is not the law, but merely an 
authority of indeterminate persuasiveness.  In addition, despite the 
comments to the Restatement that discuss the merits of passive investing, 
the common law of trusts has not recognized a duty to index.
234
  Nor does it 
seem likely that the law will independently evolve in that direction.  In the 
wake of the recent financial crisis, the strong form of the efficient markets 
hypothesis (which holds that market prices always incorporate all relevant 
information, private or public) has been widely left for dead; the influence 
of modern portfolio theory (the conceptual underpinning to the prudent 
investor rule as expressed in the Restatement) may well have passed its 
peak.  In this context, one particular reading of the Restatement may seem 
too fragile a foundation for a significant change in the law governing 
defined contribution pensions. 
I am not arguing for a blanket prohibition on active investing by 
trustees—only for the presumption against active funds that is already 
implied by the comments to the Restatement.  I do not expect that courts 
 
 234.  See, e.g., CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR. & CHARLES E. ROUNDS, III, LORING AND 
ROUNDS: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK § 6.2.2.1, at 488–93 (2009) (discussing arguments for 
and against indexing in general and for trusts). 
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would use that presumption to immediately find that any trustee who has 
invested in active funds has breached her fiduciary duties.  Instead, they 
should use it to ask trustees to explain their conduct in light of the 
principles of the Restatement.
235
  For example, a trustee who delegates 
investment responsibility to a fund manager need only explain why that 
manager “possesses or has access to the competence necessary to carry out 
the [investment] program”;
236
 a trustee who can give a reasonable response 
to that question is unlikely to have breached her fiduciary duty.  The 
Restatement recognizes that each trustee must take into account the 
particular circumstances of the trust and its beneficiaries, providing ample 
latitude for trustees to adopt appropriate investment strategies. 
This flexibility afforded to individual trustees is less applicable to the 
world of defined contribution pension plans, all of which have the same 
objective (retirement saving) and each of which is responsible for large 
numbers of employees in differing financial circumstances.  These factors 
imply that there should be less tolerance for investment strategies that take 
on risk that could be diversified away and incur expenses that could be 
avoided.  Even so, this Article argues only for a presumption:  Plan 
sponsors would still have the opportunity to explain why they chose to 
offer active funds in their pension plans.  A fiduciary who could provide 
convincing evidence of why she believed, after a reasonable investigation, 
that a particular active fund promised net expected returns higher than 
those of an index fund would be unlikely to face liability. 
Finally, my recommended solution is a regulatory change by the 
Department of Labor, not a sudden change in the way that courts interpret 
trust investment law.  The fundamental reason why the Department should 
make that change is not simply that it is dictated by the Restatement of 
Trusts, but that it is good policy:  Encouraging companies to shift their 
401(k) plan offerings from active funds to low-cost index funds will, in the 
aggregate, reduce the fees paid by plan participants and increase the 
amount of money eventually available to them in retirement.  This Article 
shows that changing the section 404(c) regulations to favor index funds is, 
at the very least, consistent with a plausible reading of trust law and 
ERISA, even if other readings are possible.  In other words, the 
interpretation presented here provides the doctrinal support necessary for 
the Department to make a regulatory change that is desirable on policy 
grounds—which, in the end, is what matters to ordinary Americans. 
 
 235.  See Meyer v. Berkshire Life Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 544, 566 (D. Md. 2003) (asking 
defendants to explain their conduct in light of modern portfolio theory). 
 236.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2) (2007). 
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B. Other Retirement Savings Vehicles 
The proposals of this Article only address one component of the 
American retirement savings system:  employer-sponsored defined 
contribution plans.  As described above, in addition to the $2.5 trillion 
invested in mutual funds through such plans, another $2.2 trillion is 
invested in mutual funds through the various types of individual retirement 
accounts.  The policy arguments against active funds in 401(k) plans apply 
equally well against active funds in IRAs.  Why not change the rules for 
IRAs as well?  And why stop there?  Why not change the rules for all 
mutual funds? 
The short answer is that the legal basis for the policy change 
recommended in this Article does not apply to IRAs.  My argument is 
based on trust investment law as made applicable to employer-sponsored 
pension plans through ERISA.  ERISA does not apply to IRAs, and there is 
no equivalent to section 404(c) and its enabling regulations that sets 
substantive criteria for IRA investments.
237
  Banning active funds or 
otherwise restricting the types of investments that can be made in an IRA 
would require a new statute. 
There is also a more interesting substantive difference between 
employer-sponsored pension plans and IRAs.  An IRA provides a more 
direct relationship between the investor and the asset management industry 
than does a pension plan.  An individual can open an IRA directly with an 
asset management company, a bank, or another financial intermediary.  The 
intermediary can decide what investment options are available, but in some 
cases this includes virtually the entire universe of individual securities, 
mutual funds, and exchange-traded funds.
238
  Since an individual can 
choose any intermediary for her IRA, this means that she has an essentially 
unrestricted choice of investment alternatives.  Contrast this with an 
employer-sponsored pension plan, where the plan sponsor determines what 
investments the employee can make and on what terms. 
One could argue that IRA investors are more vulnerable than pension 
plan participants because they are dealing directly with the asset 
management industry, without the expert protection provided by 
 
 237.  An IRA can include almost any type of investment, with the exception of 
collectibles (artworks, antiques, etc.).  Retirement Plans FAQs Regarding IRAs, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-regarding-
IRAs (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 238.  Fidelity, for example, allows IRA investments in “Fidelity and non-Fidelity funds, 
stocks, bonds/U.S. Treasuries, FDIC-insured CDs, annuities, and ETFs.” Choosing 
Investments for Your IRA, FIDELITY INVS., https://www.fidelity.com/retirement/learn-about-
iras/choosing-investments (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
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sophisticated employers.  This argument, however, is premised on the 
assumption that those sophisticated employers are actually doing a good 
job of looking out for employee interests, which is currently not the case.  
Instead, in a practical sense, many plan participants are worse off than IRA 
investors, who at least have the opportunity (whether or not they take it) to 
seek out low-cost index funds for their retirement savings. 
The problem with employer-sponsored pensions is the failure of plan 
sponsors to live up to their fiduciary duties.  This is precisely the kind of 
problem that trust law and ERISA are intended to solve.  Fiduciary duties 
are typically imposed in situations where one party is vulnerable to another 
party, whether through asymmetric information, unequal bargaining power, 
or some other imbalance that cannot be redressed directly.  With pension 
plans, employees cannot access the free market directly and are dependent 
on their employers to negotiate for them, yet those employers are not 
complying with their existing fiduciary duties.  This Article simply 
proposes to enforce those duties. 
By contrast, the problem with IRAs is one not of negligent fiduciaries 
but of market failure.  Since consumers effectively have access to the entire 
market, the legal response, if any, should be to increase consumer 
protection, not to enforce fiduciary duties.  The traditional mechanisms for 
consumer protection, as discussed above, are product regulation and 
disclosure.  Given the known failings of disclosure in the context of 
financial products, perhaps the best solution from a policy standpoint 
would be to exclude active funds from IRAs.  But this would be a 
particularly draconian solution.  It would have to be a categorical ban.  
There is no practical way to create a presumption against active funds 
because IRA custodians do not play the investment-selection role played by 
pension plan administrators.  To be coherent, it would have to extend to 
investments in individual securities as well, since they are, by definition, 
much less diversified than the typical active fund.  And because this policy 
would restrict individual choice in a free (although tax-preferred) market—
as opposed to restricting the choices of plan sponsors with fiduciary 
responsibilities to participants—it has to be balanced against the value of 
individual autonomy.  Although I believe that restrictions on IRA 
investments would make ordinary investors, in the aggregate, better off,
239
 
 
 239.  One concern raised occasionally is that if everyone were to invest in index funds, 
no one would try to pick stocks anymore, so the market would lose the ability to set prices.  
See, e.g., Rounds & Rounds, supra note 234, § 6.2.2.1, at 491.  Even if active funds were 
barred from employer-sponsored pension plans and from IRAs, however, many people 
would continue to pick stocks, including hedge fund managers, defined benefit pension 
funds, active fund managers (investing funds from people’s non-retirement accounts), and 
individuals (in their own non-retirement accounts). 
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the legal case for it is ultimately more difficult to make. 
What this discussion reveals, perhaps more than anything else, is the 
fragmented, patchwork nature of our retirement system and the laws that 
define it.  This Article has argued that ERISA can be used to give 
employees better investment options and increase their retirement security.  
It is still true, however, that substantive changes to the world of defined 
contribution pensions have to be fit through a statutory window designed 
for a defined benefit world that is slowly fading into history—and once 
people leave their employers and roll over their account balances into 
IRAs, they enter a new world with its own legal rules.  What we really need 
is a new, comprehensive legal structure for retirement savings, which could 
even be integrated with Social Security.  But that is a subject for another 
time. 
CONCLUSION 
The retirement security of ordinary American workers has been a 
major concern of public policy since at least the 1930s, when it led to the 
establishment of Social Security.  In the United States, however, insuring 
workers against destitution in their old age has never been left solely to the 
federal government.  Instead, from the 1930s through the 1950s, the federal 
government and the private sector, through both collaboration and conflict, 
established a system of both public and private retirement benefits.  
Generally speaking, business leaders were opposed to the complete 
federalization of retirement insurance (and the higher payroll taxes it would 
entail), both because they opposed government expansion and because they 
used pension plans to pursue private ends—notably, attracting workers and 
later inducing them to retire.  They favored employer-provided pensions as 
a complement to Social Security and as an alternative to the further 
expansion of Social Security. 
Both the federal government and the business community got 
something out of this grand bargain, which was worked out in rough 
fashion over the decades.  The government provided tax benefits to private 
employers in order to increase coverage of workers by private pension 
plans.  In exchange for the tax benefits, the assets in those plans had to be 
held in trust for their participants and beneficiaries.  The expansion of 
private pensions also relieved the federal government of some of the 
responsibility for supporting the elderly, albeit in a haphazard fashion, 
since not all workers have access to pensions.  Finally, the passage of 
ERISA in 1974 imposed sweeping regulation on private pension plans, 
confirming their public importance as a major pillar of America’s 
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retirement system.
240
 
Since 1974, employers have not kept up their end of the bargain.  The 
replacement of defined benefit plans by defined contribution plans has 
shifted funding and investment risk from employers onto employees.
241
  As 
a result, while most pension plans today offer a tax-advantaged way to save 
for retirement, they do not provide retirement insurance in any meaningful 
sense.  The advantages for a company of shifting risk onto its employees 
are so great and so obvious (and individual accounts are so attractive to 
many people) that there is no way of going back to the world of defined 
benefit plans, and there is nothing any reading of ERISA can do about that.  
But participant-directed defined contribution plans are governed by ERISA, 
and hence by its fiduciary duty provisions, themselves rooted in trust law.  
The key question is what those provisions mean in the context of 
participant direction.  This Article has argued that ERISA does have 
something important to say about such plans:  The protection of section 
404(c) should extend only to plans that, through the prudent selection of 
investment alternatives, ensure that participant assets are invested in 
conformity with the basic principles of trust law and sound investing.  This 
implies that the section 404(c) safe harbor is not available to plans that 
include actively managed mutual funds; to make this clear, its 
implementing regulations should be rewritten to exclude such plans. 
Such a strong presumption against active fund management would be 
difficult to maintain in the realm of ordinary investing, especially given the 
current dominance of the paradigm of investor sovereignty.  But this 
presumption makes legal, political, and historical sense in the context of 
pension plans, which are governed by ERISA in the name of retirement 
security.  Again, this interpretation of ERISA would not ensure retirement 
security for plan participants; they would still need to save enough money 
while working and not withdraw it prematurely, and they would still be 
subject to investment risk.  But for any level of expected return, they would 
be subject to less investment risk, and they would lose significantly less 
money due to fees along the way.  This result is entirely consistent with the 
basic purpose of ERISA’s regulation of pension plans (and of the tax 
preferences granted to those plans):  increasing the number of people who 
enjoy a decent income in retirement.  It is also consistent with the history of 
 
 240.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (“The Congress finds . . . that the continued well-
being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by 
these [employee benefit] plans; that they are affected with a national public interest; that 
they have become an important factor affecting the stability of employment and the 
successful development of industrial relations . . . .”). 
 241.  See JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY 
AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 109–35 (2008). 
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employer pension plans, which have always had the public purpose of 
improving retirement security for ordinary Americans. 
 
